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“I am tormented by an everlasting itch for things remote. I love to sail 
forbidden seas, and land on barbarous coasts.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Fittingly enough, their history begins in the same decade, their creation 
borne forward by the same ideological currents and overseen by similarly 
conversant intellects.2 In 1940, William A. Schnader,3 with the concurrence of 
a more collectively4 and poetically inclined Karl N. Llewellyn,5 proposed the 
creation of a complete commercial code for adoption by every state.6 Destined 
to become its era’s “most ambitious codification” after years of effort “by 
literally hundreds of . . . lawyers and businessmen,”7 Schnader’s project aimed 
not just to achieve the coordination of the Uniform Sales Act, the Uniform 
Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, Uniform 
Warehouse Receipts Act, and all other such acts in the field of commercial law,8 
 
 1  HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK: OR, THE WHALE 8 (Modern Library 1892) (1851). As Plutarch once 
observed, “geographers . . . crowd into the edges of their maps parts of the world which they do not know about, 
adding notes in the margin to the effect, that beyond this lies nothing but sandy deserts full of wild beasts, 
unapproachable bogs, Scythian ice, or a frozen sea . . . .” PLUTARCH, Theseus, in 2 PLUTARCH’S LIVES OF 
ILLUSTRIOUS MEN 1 (1880). 
 2  See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Curious Case of Transborder Sales Law: A Comparative Analysis of CESl, 
CISG, and the UCC, in CISG VS. REGIONAL SALES LAW UNIFICATION: WITH A FOCUS ON THE NEW COMMON 
EUROPEAN SALES LAW 28–29 (Ulrich Magnus ed., Sellier European Law Publishers 2007).  
 3  At the time, Schnader served as president of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, an organization which agitated for and drafted uniform laws on commercial subjects in 1896, 1906, 
1909, 1918, and 1933. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541 n.1, 545–46 (2006). 
 4  Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949–54, 49 BUFF. L. 
REV. 359, 392 (2001). 
 5  Id. at 277; cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 11 (Steven 
Sheppard ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1930) (“The lawyer’s slip in etiquette is the client’s ruin. From this 
angle I say procedural regulations are the door, and the only door, to make real what is laid down by substantive 
law. Procedural regulations enter into and condition all substantive law’s becoming actual when there is a 
dispute.”).  
 6  Maggs, supra note 3, at 541 n.1, 546; see also, e.g., William A. Schnader, A Short History of the 
Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1967) (setting forth 
his role); Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 
799–800 (1958) (retelling this same history). 
 7  Soia Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167, 167 (1964). 
Soia Mentschikoff had married Llewellyn in 1946 and served as his assistant reporter. Braucher, supra note 6, 
at 800; Kamp, supra note 4, at 277–78. In 1964, she represented the United States at The Hague to push for the 
adoption of an international uniform sales law, thereby playing a role in CISG’s own evolution. See, e.g., E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Soia Mentschikoff as Reformer, 16 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1964). 
 8  By 1940, neither these laws nor their amendments had been enacted by every state. Schnader, supra 
note 6, at 2. 
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but also their modernization and extension to then-unregulated fields.9 Nearly a 
decade later, Llewellyn, Schnader’s chosen reporter,10 and the peerless drafting 
crew that he assembled released a draft composed of nine integrated articles, 
with notes and comments appended.11 In August 1953, after several minor 
amendments were proposed and ratified, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC 
or U.C.C.) saw the day’s light.12 Meanwhile, touched by this same desire for 
predictability and uniformity in commercial matters,13 Ernst Rabel, a German 
Jew destined to flee to the United States,14 crafted the progenitor of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG or 
C.I.S.G.),15 its immediate predecessor—the Uniform Law on the Formation of 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods—adopted in 1964,16 and thereby gained unofficial 
 
 9  Walter D. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United States, 12 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 226, 
229 (1963); see also Schnader, supra note 6, at 2 (summarizing these laws’ perceived problems, including 
“inconsistencies between the several acts themselves” and the fact “that . . . certain of the provisions of these 
acts had become, if not obsolete, at least not suitable to govern the business practices of the day”). Interestingly, 
despite its focus on uniformity, the UCC was proposed so as to undercut a movement for a federal sales law.  
 10  Schnader, supra note 6, at 4. 
 11  Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve The 
Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1141 n.1 (1985). See also Schnader, 
supra note 6, at 5. 
 12  Braucher, supra note 6, at 800–01; see also Schnader, supra note 6, at 6–8 (summarizing the process). 
Because the UCC’s adoption proceeded state-by-state, it has no single effective date. However, by 1968, it had 
been ratified by every state except Louisiana, though many did so after making a bewildering array of alterations. 
See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of 
Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 337 (1978–79). Of course, the UCC’s own ambiguous language did not 
help, id., as Llewellyn seemingly once conceded, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. 
L. REV. 779, 784 (1953) (“I am ashamed of . . . [the Code] in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could 
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas I tried to get in that would have been good for the law, but 
I was voted down.”). 
 13  Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 
459 (2009); see also Edita Ubartaite, Application of the CISG in the United States, 7 EUR. J. L. REFORM 277, 
279 (2005). 
 14  For more on this extraordinary man, see Max Rheinstein, In Memory of Ernst Rabel, 5 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 185 (1956). 
 15  United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 1(1)(a), Apr. 11, 1980, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CISG”]. Throughout this discussion, two administrative 
facts should be kept in mind. First, CISG has never been published in an official United States treaty source. 
Second, while the treaty itself was adopted on April 11, 1980, and transmitted to the Senate on September 21, 
1983, the United States ratified it on December 11, 1986. Within the United States, it became effective on 
January 1, 1988. 15 U.S.C. App. at 332 (1998), observed in VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 
No. 12 C 8154, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29791, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2013). 
 16  Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 13, at 459–60. The International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) produced other drafts in 1956, 1958, and 1963. Anthony S. Winer, The CISG 
Convention and Thomas Franck’s Theory of Legitimacy, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 6 (1998–99). In 1968, the 
United Nation Commission on International Trade Law (“UNICTRAL”) was established. Schwenzer & 
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designation as this treaty’s grandfather17 and christened himself as its 
mastermind.18 As this history suggests, each of these two protocols emerged 
from the minds of realists enamored of standardization.19 In time, CISG 
(“arguably the most influential uniform law on transborder sales in the world 
today”)20 and the UCC (the controlling commercial code in forty-nine states21 
and so regnant as to be classified as federal common law by sundry courts22 and 
to be implied into countless contracts)23 became part of the fabric of U.S. law, 
equally binding within their fixed sphere.24 
Enjoying an “uneasy coexistence,” CISG and the UCC converge in some 
details even as they diverge in other particulars.25 Philosophically, under either 
 
Hachem, supra note 13, at 460. It was UNICTRAL that produced the draft that became CISG in 1980 Vienna. 
Id. 
 17  See Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1993); see also Michael B. Lopez, 
Resurrecting the Public Good: Amending the Validity Exception in the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods for the 21st Century, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 133, 138 (2009–10). 
 18  Bernard Grossfeld & Peter Winship, The Law Professor Refugee, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COMP. 3, 
11 (1992); see also Ulrich Magnus, The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) Between Civil and Common Law-Best 
of All Worlds?, 3 J. CIV. L. 67, 72–73, 73 n.22 (2010) (summarizing Rabel’s role and citing Grossfeld & Winship, 
supra note 18, at 11). 
 19  See Grossfeld & Winship, supra note 18, at 9–13; see also, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and 
Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 410–16 (2004–05); Kamp, supra 
note 4, at 283, 286. Tantalizingly, from 1931 and 1940, Llewelyn and Rabel exchanged a number of letters 
regarding their ongoing projects. Grossfeld & Winship, supra note 18, at 13–17 (detailing the relationship 
between Llewellyn and Rabel from 1931 to 1940). Rabel, it seems, initially “believed he had a personal 
relationship with Llewellyn and that the latter held him in high esteem” and “expect[ed] the drafters of the 
Uniform Commercial Code to receive him with open arms.” Id. at 15. He thus tried to persuade Llewellyn to 
coordinate his draft of the UCC with his 1935 draft, and Llewellyn at one point even “speculated that special 
rules for international trade may be inserted into the [Uniform Commercial] Code.” Id. at 15, 17. For all its 
potential, these giants’ collaboration proved brief, and no more letters were exchanged after January 1940. Id. 
at 13, 17. 
 20  Carla Spivak, Of Shrinking Sweatsuits and Poison Vine Wax: A Comparison of Basis for Excuse Under 
U.C.C. § 2-615 and CISG Article 79, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 757, 757 (2006); see also Magnus, supra note 
18, at 71 (“[T]he Convention has become the most important legal basis of today’s globalized trade.”).  
 21  See, e.g., In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc., 337 F.3d 951, 955 (7th Cir. 2003); A. Brooke Overby, 
Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 653 (1995–96); Ellen A. Peters, Remedies for Breach of 
Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 
YALE L.J. 199, 199 (1963). 
 22  See, e.g., Curtin v. United Airlines, Inc., 275 F.3d 88, 93 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2001); O’Neill v. United States, 
50 F.3d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Conrad Publ’g Co., 589 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1978). 
Considering the UCC’s dominance amongst the fifty states, this result follows from the usual axiom that “a 
federal court applying federal common law will often simply incorporate the law of the appropriate state if there 
is no relevant federal interest to justify a distinct federal rule.” United States v. Fleet Bank (In re Calore Express 
Co.), 288 F.3d 22, 52 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 23  See DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 30. 
 24  See Winer, supra note 16, at 2. 
 25  DiMatteo, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
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legal regime, the goods portion of a certain contract effectively dominates, and 
both codes contain analogous provisions for defining absent terms and afford 
decided recognition of party and industry customs and practices. Indeed, some 
of the same defects taint both, most especially their failure to account for the 
increasing use of computers in domestic and international sales. This frequent 
concord follows naturally, as Rabel saw the “English common law tradition”26 
from which the UCC grew as “best suited for . . . international unification.”27  
In spite of this congruence, however, their divergences are equally manifest. 
Focused purely on business interests and contract formation, CISG adopts 
subjective standards, requires neither writing (with some exceptions) nor 
consideration, and constructs a mottled remedial scheme in which specific 
performance is enthroned above all others. The UCC, in turn, places foremost 
emphasis on objective criteria, addressing contract formation and validity for 
businesses and consumers. Properly applied, CISG may allow for the creation 
of a contract that would otherwise not exist under the UCC or assess the value 
of a claim rather differently than the UCC would dare try. In other words, CISG 
promotes performance even in the presence of a breach—and punishes obdurate 
nonperformance accordingly. Regardless of their plethora of similarities, then, 
CISG and the UCC are not wholly alike in analytical methodology and practical 
effect.  
Unfortunately, federal and state courts in the United States have only 
imperfectly and haphazardly heeded this basic verity, thereby spawning an 
amorphous body of law characterized by more glaring omissions and errata than 
nuanced analysis. With impressive consistency, federal and state courts invoke 
the UCC as a guide and proceed to utilize its provisions. Eliding distinctions, 
though subject to two exceptions, these tribunals either utilize an improper—
and thus interpretively forbidden—methodology or reach a mistaken—and 
textually unjustifiable—conclusion regarding a contract’s existence or an 
award’s propriety. Even where CISG’s writ is acknowledged, U.S. decisions on 
this seminal treaty evidence an erroneous tendency to look first to case law, then 
to the statute, on the part of even the most assiduous jurist. In short, domestic 
law interpreting CISG remains rather limited in its quantity and haphazard in its 
 
 26  Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, Rabel misconstrued the true origins of modern contract law. “The 
common law was property-based,” which is why Sir. William Blackstone, its great expositor, devoted little time 
to contracts or commercial law. Douglas G. Baird, Llewellyn’s Heirs, 62 LA. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2002). 
“[U]nderstanding that commercial law must be shaped by the world in which it operates and the forces at work 
there,” Llewellyn constructed the UCC based on “the Law Merchant” and not English common law. Id. at 1290.  
 27  Magnus, supra note 18, at 74.  
SHACHMUROVE GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:41 PM 
2018] CISG AS THE MEASURE OF A CLAIM’S VALUE 467 
reasoning, and difficulties thus confront any lawyer seeking to discover and cite 
cogent authority on a client’s behalf.  
Considering the preeminent role of contracts in the determination of a 
debtor’s liabilities in cases filed under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),28 the 
defects so endemic in CISG’s jurisprudence have already arisen within a handful 
of bankruptcy courts,29 as too few have noticed.30 In fact, as more global 
contracts are forged and as the Code internationalizes, these weaknesses may 
proliferate, tainting future liquidations or stymieing coming reorganizations in 
which more than purely domestic debts or actors are implicated. With “[t]he 
growing body of case law interpreting and using the CISG involv[ing] not only 
its direct application to creditors’ rights, but the indirect guidance that the CISG 
might offer to provide meaning or context in resolving a range of disputes and 
ambiguities in seemingly unrelated American law,”31 the time is nigh for 
bankruptcy’s practitioners, scholars, and judges to attain a fundamental 
understanding of CISG’s nuances and ambiguities and thereby avoid replicating 
the mistakes of their non-bankruptcy predecessors.  
In four substantive parts, this Article provides a first scholarly look at 
CISG’s intersection with bankruptcy law so as to address the impending crisis. 
Part I portrays one common scenario, derived from a recent New York case, in 
which CISG and the UCC clashed prior to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing but 
without the cognizance of the relevant state court. Setting the stage for this 
Article’s synthesis, Part II summarizes several bankruptcy provisions whose 
interpretation often requires reference to the UCC and, therefore, CISG, and Part 
III précises CISG’s jurisdictional provisions and interpretive scheme. Finally, 
Part IV limns the kind of analysis compelled by CISG as to three areas—contract 
formation, breach, and damages—directly relevant to the adjudication of a 
creditor’s claims. As this part shows, even where the Code reigns, CISG and the 
UCC often clash—and compel the adherence of court and party to an altered 
path. So long as such diligence is not observed, precedent will be defied, 
international obligations defiled, while too many estates will never dissolve in 
 
 28  The specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 inclusive, are 
referred to in this Article as “section _” or “§ _” unless otherwise noted.  
 29  Unless otherwise noted, the term “court” in this Article is to a U.S. Bankruptcy Court. If capitalized 
but not the first word in a sentence, it refers to the Supreme Court of the United States.  
 30  See Jonathan S. Hawkins & Jennifer L. Maffett-Nickelman, The Rise of International Standards in the 
Sale of Goods, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2017, at 44. 
 31  Id. 
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essential peace. Unlike the best of sailors, stranded on a becalmed sea, too few 
have sensed the faint stirrings of a distant storm.32 
I. A COMEDY OF ERRORS33 
In the fall of 2003, an American entrepreneur, Mr. Adams, created five 
corporations (individually, Corporation, and collectively Corporations) in 
accordance with New York law. With the support of a majority of each entity’s 
shareholders, he ascended to the rank of managing director of every Corporation, 
assuming control of their collective but still inchoate foreign operations. As 
financial analysts will eventually discover, each Corporation was but a shell, and 
as a court would later decide, each shell was but an alter ego of Mr. Adams. In 
these heady early days, however, artful paperwork obscured these dear verities.  
In time, Mr. Adams fabricated a connection between the Corporations and 
several foreign entities (collectively, the Parties). In 2004, Mr. Adams, acting on 
the formers’ behalves, signed contracts for the production of concrete goods with 
a slew of manufacturers based in Hong Kong (Manufacturers). A single Hong 
Kong corporation (Trading Co. or Agent),34 itself managed by one natural 
person, Ms. Ng (individually, Plaintiff, and collectively, Plaintiffs), negotiated 
these arrangements; Trading Co. was also charged with ensuring the goods 
produced conformed to explicit and painstakingly specified quality standards set 
by Mr. Adams from his offices in New York. For the first five years, no disputes 
arose, as the manufacturers produced, the Plaintiffs monitored, and the 
corporations sold. In the meantime, in a method commonly employed in certain 
industries, the Corporations’ American representative sold the accounts 
receivable to various investors, using these accounts as collateral for larger and 
larger loans. Neither these purchasers’ identities nor these secondary transfers 
were ever disclosed to any person but Mr. Adams, and he alone was privy to 
these dizzying exchanges’ every detail. Vagaries aside, this tightening 
 
 32  See CARL SAGAN, PALE BLUE DOT: A VISION OF THE HUMAN FUTURE IN SPACE (1994). 
 33  The scenario depicted here is based on Lisa Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2013). But for the fact that the debtor’s discharge would be denied pursuant to § 727, the problem detailed in 
this Article might have come to pass, making it a tragedy rather than a comedy.  
 34  Factoring is the sale of receivables to a third party at a discount from their face value. J. LEACH & 
RONALD MELICHER, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 490 (2014). Under a typical factoring arrangement, 
receivables are sold outright from originators (e.g., manufacturers, distributors, or retail dealers) to the factor for 
cash at a discount. Barkley Clark, Factoring: Key Issues under the UCC, THE COMMERCIAL FACTOR: 
NEWSLETTER FOR THE FACTORING INDUSTRY, Spring 2004, at 1–2. As such, although Mr. Adams referred to 
Charming Trading as a “factor,” this plaintiff would be more correctly termed “an agent,” as its activities did 
not include the selling of accounts.  
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relationship and these funds’ fluidity were not unusual occurrences in the world 
of international trade and finance.35  
Thereafter, conflicts among the Asian manufacturers, the Plaintiffs, and the 
Corporations arose. The Corporations, it is later shown, had received goods 
without remitting a cent to the Plaintiffs. At the same time, the latter had made 
promises to the manufacturers of certain payment based on Mr. Adams’s 
purported representations. Ultimately, with the apparent encouragement of Mr. 
Adams, the Plaintiffs, Trading Co. as a corporation and Ng as an individual, 
employed their own credit to purchase merchandise for the dithering 
Corporations and to cover the costs of shipping these goods to the United States. 
With the manufacturers still unpaid and the Corporations either unwilling or 
unable to pay in full for the merchandise already delivered, Trading Co. and then 
Ng eventually defaulted on their multimillion dollar obligations. Professedly 
besieged by escalating threats, Ng somehow fled to New York’s Chinatown. 
There, financed by unknown sources, she sued the Corporations and Mr. Adams 
personally for numerous contract breaches, claiming millions in damages, in the 
Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court for Kings County (“State 
Court”). Of the more than dozen counts in the original complaint, the seventh 
specifically sought to pierce the Corporations’ veils and render Mr. Adams 
directly liable for the promises ostensibly made in their names.36 Based on the 
Parties’ filings—and without either Party’s objection—the State Court turned to 
New York’s variant of the UCC.  
In the midst of pretrial maneuverings, the Code suddenly intruded. In 
December 2013, Mr. Adams quietly filed a voluntary individual chapter 7 
petition, transforming himself into both a defendant in one state court and a 
debtor in a federal one. In response, the State Court severed Mr. Adams from its 
case and proceeded to adjudicate the remaining causes of action against the 
extant defendants: the Corporations that Mr. Adams effectively controlled. For 
reasons never acknowledged, the Corporations were now represented by no 
natural person and suddenly bereft of counsel, though Mr. Adams still regularly 
appeared, unmoving and uninvolved, as the State Court trial progressed. 
Meanwhile, in the Debtor’s first and only bankruptcy case, the Plaintiffs 
submitted proofs of claim based on the same contracts on which it had sued in 
state court. Indeed, the bases of its proofs of claim against the Debtor were the 
 
 35  See generally David B. Tatge & Jeremy B. Tatge, The Fundamentals of Factoring, PRACTICAL LAW: 
THE JOURNAL, Sept. 2012. 
 36  This pleading formulation follows naturally from New York law’s amalgamation of the common law 
alter ego doctrine and veil-piercing into one “rule of corporate disregard.” In re Adler, 494 B.R. at 56. 
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five causes of action already pleaded, each predicated on the Corporations’ and 
Mr. Adams’ alleged UCC violations. Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs initiated an 
adversary proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 700137 
to bar the discharge of each alleged debt pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A) and (B). For 
the next few years, the State Court case against the Corporations and the 
bankruptcy case involving Mr. Adams unspooled. Meanwhile, even as the 
Plaintiffs prosecuted their action against the Debtor in bankruptcy court, no 
Corporation filed a petition under the Code’s eleventh chapter.  
II. RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY LAW: THE CODE AND THE RULES 
A. Code and Rules 
As originally planned and as consistently construed, the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (“Rules”)38 complement the Code’s sections. As of 
October 1, 1979,39 the Code has defined “the creation, alteration or elimination 
of substantive rights,”40 while the Rules have “define[d] the process by which 
these privileges may be effected”;41 “nearly all procedural matters” having “left 
to the Rules . . . .”42 Congress, moreover, “left significant statutory gaps that 
implicate various core bankruptcy policies, including fresh-start and distributive 
policies, thereby enabling the courts to set policy while engaging in case-by-case 
 
 37  The essential features of an adversary proceeding, beyond the ten types listed in Rule 7001, is often 
unclear. See Amir Shachmurove, Bankruptcy Rule 7004(h) after Espinosa: A Timely Distinction between 
Constitutional and Statutory Service, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, June 2014. Here, it was not.  
 38  Throughout this Article, the terms “Rule” and “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, and the terms “federal rule” and “federal rules” refer to all the rules adopted pursuant to the Rules 
Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2075 (2012).  
 39  The Code became effective on this day. See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, n.2 (2d Cir. 
1982); In re Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 945, 102 S. Ct. 1443, 71 L. Ed. 
2d 658 (1982). 
 40  Branchburg Plaza Assocs., L.P. v. Fesq (In re Fesq), 153 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hanover 
Indus. Mach. Co. v. Am. Can Co. (In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co.), 61 B.R. 551, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)), 
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1018 (1999); see also, e.g., Asher v. Am. Mortg. Servicing Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R. 
58, 70 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting In re Fesq, 153 F.3d at 116); Parker v. Bain (In re Parker), 68 F.3d 
1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 61 B.R. at 552). 
 41  In re Fesq, 153 F.3d at 116; see also, e.g., Marshall v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Marshall), 491 B.R. 217, 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting SLW Capital, LLC v. Mansaray-Ruffin (In re Masaray-Ruffin), 530 F.3d 230, 
237–38 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted)); Phillips v. First City, Tx. (In re Phillips), 966 F.2d 926, 934 (5th Cir. 
1992) (citing In re Hanover Indus. Mach. Co., 61 B.R. at 552); John J. Murphy, The Essence of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, 90 COM. L.J. 442, 443 (1985) (“The . . . Rules govern the procedure in bankruptcy . . . .”).  
 42  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 449 (1977); In re Tallerico, 532 B.R. 774, 785–86, n.17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 
2015); In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 271 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987) (citing this history as support for the view “that the 
. . . Rules cannot limit the operation of the bankruptcy statutes”).  
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dispute resolution.”43 Due to the Code’s persistent ambiguities and the Rules’ 
procedural, albeit cabined, primacy, these two sources must often be construed 
together as discrete parts of an interlocking and integrated legal framework.44 
However, “[w]hen in conflict, the . . . Code trumps the . . . Rules”45 is the 
unmistakable mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act.46 Still, with much 
effort, courts have striven to avoid such inconsistency by means of varied canons 
and presumptions.47  
B. Determination of a Claim’s Validity and Value  
Operating concurrently, §§ 501 and 502 and the Rules govern the means by 
which creditors and equity security holders present their claims or interests to a 
bankruptcy court and set forth the guidelines according to which claims are to 
be allowed or disallowed.48  
Section 501 and Rules 3001, 3002, 3003, 3004, 3005, and 3006 specify how 
and when a proof must or may be filed; these timeliness requirements are 
intended “to aid in the orderly and efficient administration of bankruptcy 
cases.”49 Per § 501(a), a creditor or indenture trustee “may file a proof of 
claim.”50 Per paragraphs (b) and (c), a party liable to a creditor with the debtor 
 
 43  Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 
UCLA L. REV. 384, 402 (2012); cf. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 
11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 294 (1993). 
 44  This approach aligns with the courts’ general treatment of procedural rules. See, e.g., Amir 
Shachmurove, Disruptions’ Function: A Defense of (Some) Form Objections under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 12 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 161, 194–97 (Spring 2016). 
 45  In re Logan Place Props, Ltd., 327 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (collecting cases). 
 46  28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2014); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978); Amir 
Shachmurove, Purchasing Claims and Changing Votes: Establishing “Cause” under Rule 3018(a), 89 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 511, 538–41 (2015) [hereinafter Shachmurove, Claims]. 
 47  Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 528–31. 
 48  11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (2014); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001–3008; In re Tucker, 174 B.R. 732, 741 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1994) (“Whether a claim is eligible to be considered under § 502 depends first on whether the claim 
has been properly and timely filed. Only after a proper filing per § 501 and a timely filing per Rule 3002 
(incorporated into § 501), may a claim be considered under § 502’s standards regarding disallowance.”). 
 49  In re Macias, 195 B.R. 659, 662 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996); cf. Leadbetter v. Snyder (In re Snyder), 544 
B.R. 905, 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2016) (in seeking to resolve the apparent conflict between § 523(a)(3) and 
§ 726(a)(2)(C), observing that many courts “start with the premise that the central purpose of the Bankruptcy 
Code is to allow the debtor to reorder his or her affairs and enjoy a fresh start”). 
 50  11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); In re Makwa Builders, LLC, No. 12-13664, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 355, at 
*32 & n.15 (Bankr. D.N.M. Feb. 4, 2016); see also, e.g., Hilton v. US Bank (In re Hilton), 544 B.R. 1, 16–17 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining the claim allowance process for filing and disputing claim set forth in § 501 
and § 502). 
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and the debtor itself, respectively, may file a proof if the claim holder does not 
do so in a timely manner.51  
Not these Code sections, with their discretionary “may,”52 but manifold rules 
offer more thorough guidance. If a debtor has scheduled a creditor’s specific 
obligation, the amount stated on Schedule D, E, or F constitutes prima facie 
evidence of the claim’s validity and amount unless it is scheduled as “disputed, 
contingent, or unliquidated.”53 The necessity of filing a proof of claim, “a written 
statement setting forth a creditor’s claim” that “shall conform substantially to 
the appropriate official form,” depends on the particular Code chapter.54 In cases 
under chapters 7, 12, and 13, an unsecured creditor or an equity security holder 
must submit such a proof within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting 
of the creditors required by § 341(a) except for certain explicitly defined 
exceptions.55 In a chapter 9 or a chapter 11 case, a proof need be filed only if 
either the claim is listed in the debtor’s official schedules as disputed, contingent, 
or unliquidated, or the creditor disagrees with the amount of the claim listed in 
the debtor’s schedules.56 For all chapters, if a creditor fails to file a proof, a 
debtor or trustee may do so “within 30 days of the expiration of the time for 
filing such claims prescribed by Rule 3002(c) or 3003(c)”;57 in these 
circumstances, any entity liable or potentially liable to a creditor may file a proof 
on that creditor’s behalf within the same timeframe.58 Once a proof is filed, the 
 
 51  11 U.S.C. §§ 501(b)–(c) (2012); see, e.g., Matteson v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Matteson), 535 B.R. 
156, 164 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2015) (citing § 501(c)); Denke v. PNC Bank, N.A. (In re Denke), 524 B.R. 644, 651 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015) (citing § 501(b)).  
 52  See, e.g., Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he 
mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”); Rastelli v. Warden, 
Metro. Corr. Ctr., 782 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The use of a permissive verb – ‘may review’ instead of ‘shall 
review’—suggests a discretionary rather than mandatory review process.”).  
 53  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(a); Banco Latino Int’l v. Gomez-Lopez (In re Banco Latino Int’l), 310 B.R. 
780, 786 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (distinguishing between Rule 3002, “the claims processing rule that applies to 
Chapter 7 and 13 cases,” and Rule 3003, which applies to chapter 9 and 11 cases). 
 54  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(a); Am. Express Bank, FSB v. Askenaizer (In re Plourde), 418 B.R. 495, 503–
04 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009) (citing Rule 3001(a) and adding that “the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 
which provide the procedural framework for the filing and allowance of claims, regulate the form, content, and 
attachments for proofs of claim”).  
 55  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a), (c); see In re Gonzalez Aleman, 499 B.R. 236, 239–40 (Bankr. D.P.R. 
2013) (discussing these paragraphs’ interplay). 
 56  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003; Pioneer Invs. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 
382–83 (1993). This distinction resembles the one made between “liability or amount” in § 303(b). 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 303(b)(1), (h)(1) (2012).  
 57  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3004; McDermott v. Davis (In re Davis), 538 B.R. 368, 382 n.8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
2015). 
 58  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3005(a); Morton v. Morton (In re Morton), 298 B.R. 301, 305 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 
2003). 
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value stated therein supersedes the amount scheduled by the debtor,59 but if a 
proof is subsequently disallowed for lack of timeliness, the claim as scheduled 
will be reinstated for purposes of the estate’s distribution.60 A proof and thereby 
a claim may be withdrawn, though the holder’s obligations vary depending on 
whether an objection has been lodged or an adversary proceeding has been 
inaugurated.61 If a claimant follows the foregoing process, a claim is born. 
Such a filing triggers the allowance and disallowance process specified in 
the Code and the Rules.62 As with a claim actually scheduled,63 a proof filed in 
conformity with the Rules constitutes prima facie evidence of the claim’s 
“validity” and “amount.”64 The claim memorialized in such a proof is deemed 
allowed “unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a 
partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.”65 In 
making such a protestation, so as to rebut a proof’s presumptive validity or 
amount, a debtor or trustee must produce sufficiently substantial evidence.66 
Once such evidence is presented, the burden shifts, and the claimant must now 
prove the claim’s validity by a preponderance of the evidence.67 Regardless of 
 
 59  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(c)(4); Bateman v. S. Dev. Corp. (In re Bateman), 435 B.R. 600, 611 (Bankr. 
E.D. Ark. 2010) (quoting Rule 3003(c)(4)). 
 60  Pioneer Invs. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 382–83.  
 61  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3006; Smith v. Dowden, 47 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he successful 
withdrawal of a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3006 prior to the trustee’s initiation of an adversarial 
proceeding renders the withdrawn claim a legal nullity and leaves the parties as if the claim had never been 
brought.”). 
 62  Filing also establishes the bankruptcy court’s subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the dispute 
and the relevant parties. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) (2012); Bankruptcy Servs. v. Ernst & Young (In re CBI 
Holding Co.), 529 F.3d 432, 459–60 (2d Cir. 2008); Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print 
Works, Inc.), 815 F.2d 165, 167 (1987). 
 63  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(a); Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. G-I Holdings, Inc. (In re G-I 
Holdings, Inc.), 295 B.R. 211, 221 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 64  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f); see also, e.g., In re S. Side House, LLC, 451 B.R. 248, 260 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Rule 3001(f)); In re Euliano, 442 B.R. 177, 181 & n.9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (holding 
that the value of the claim is settled due to the debtor’s failure to object). Claims not so filed are not entitled to 
this presumption. See, e.g., Caplan v. B-Line, LLC (In re Kirkland), 572 F.3d 838, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2009), 
cited with approval in Brown v. Ameriquest Funding II, LLC (In re Brown), 431 B.R. 309, 310 & n.1 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2010). 
 65  11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
 66  See, e.g., Creamer v. Motors Liquidation Co. GUC Trust (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), No. 12 Civ. 
6074 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143957, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013); In re Oneida Ltd., 400 B.R. 384, 
389 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 173–74 (3d Cir. 1992); Wright v. Holm 
(In re Holm), 931 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 67  See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 12 Civ. 6074 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143957, at 
*12–13; In re Oneida Ltd., 400 B.R. at 389; In re Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 954 F.2d at 173–74; In re Holm, 931 
F.2d at 623. 
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who must adduce sufficient proof, however, the claimant always bears the 
burden of persuasion.68 
Section 502(b) sets forth the grounds for a claim’s disallowance and thus the 
process for proving—or disproving—its legal validity.69 In accordance with this 
Code subsection,70 when determining whether to disallow a proof, applicable 
nonbankruptcy law establishes the validity of a creditor’s bankruptcy claim. 
Pursuant to § 502(b)(1) in particular, a claim may be disallowed if “such claim 
is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any 
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is 
contingent or matured.”71 Because “[a] claim [only] arises for purposes of 
bankruptcy when the relationship between the debtor and the creditor contained 
all of the elements necessary to give rise to a legal obligation . . . under the 
relevant non-bankruptcy law,”72 a court must first look to the law that gave rise 
to the specific claim.73 Necessarily, that court must consider any potential 
dispositive defenses available under this applicable nonbankruptcy law.74 For 
this very reason, in spite of Congress’ constitutional preeminence over “the 
subject of Bankruptcies,”75 external legal strictures still often comprise “the 
 
 68  E.g., United States v. Braunstein (In re Pan), 209 B.R. 152, 155–56 (D. Mass. 1997); Juniper Dev. Grp. 
v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 993 F.2d 915, 925 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 69  In re MacFarland, 462 B.R. 857, 879–80 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 
352 (1977) (“Subsection (b) prescribes the grounds on which a claim may be disallowed.”), quoted in In re 
Interco, Inc., 137 B.R. 1003, 1005 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992). 
 70  Most, but not all, courts have held that only one of the nine statutory reasons enumerated in § 502(b) 
may be invoked. See In re MacFarland, 462 B.R. 857, 880 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]he growing majority of 
courts and appellate courts have 28 U.S.C. § 2075 and 11 U.S.C. §502(b) as giving no discretion to disallow a 
claim for any reason other than those stated in § 502.”); Frontier Ins. Co. v. Westport Ins. Corp. (In re Black), 
460 B.R. 407, 416 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011) (same); Dove-Nation v. eCast Settlement Corp. (In re Dove-Nation), 
318 B.R. 147, 152 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 71  11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2012). 
 72  Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Esso Virgin Is., Inc. (In re Duplan Corp.), 212 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(quoting LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913 (1995)). An interesting counterexample to this dominant approach 
arises in the area of mass tort bankruptcies.  
 73  B-Real, LLC v. Melillo (In re Melillo), 392 B.R. 1, 5–6 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). 
 74  Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007) (“This 
provision is most naturally understood to provide that, with limited exceptions, any defense to a claim that is 
available outside of the bankruptcy context is also available in bankruptcy.”); accord Glatzer v. Enron Corp., 
No. 04 Civ. 4897 (DAB), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78696, at * 12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008) (citing Travelers, 
549 U.S. at 450).  
 75  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also, e.g., Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-
Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
353, 355–61 (2014); Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 129, 197 (2003). 
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appropriate law for determining the validity of an underlying claim” under the 
Code.76  
Just as a court must turn to non-Code law to ascertain a claim’s validity, it 
must rely on this same law to ascertain its value. Assuming the prerequisites 
specified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(c) and (e) are met,77 § 502(c) allows a court to 
estimate any contingent or unliquidated claim for purposes of allowance if either 
the fixing or liquidation of such claim would “unduly delay the administration 
of the case” or the creditor’s right to payment arises from “a right to an equitable 
remedy for breach of performance.”78 In contract actions specifically, for an 
accurate estimate of a claim’s value to be made, a court must weigh both the 
governing instrument’s precise language and the controlling statutory scheme,79 
as both sources delimitate the maximum damages permitted upon a contract’s 
breach. As with an analysis of validity pursuant to § 502(b)(1), a court is “bound 
by the substantive law that governs the ultimate value of the claim.”80 
C. Temporary Valuation Pursuant to Rule 3018(a) 
If a court wishes to avoid prematurely invalidating “problematical or non-
existent” claims81 or from delaying a chapter 11 case by invoking the 
cumbersome estimation procedures mandated by §§ 501 and 502,82 Rule 
3018(a) offers a temporary solution. In effect, despite the close logical (and 
 
 76  First City Beaumont v. Durkay (In re Ford), 967 F.2d 1047, 1053 n.6 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) 
(citing, among others, Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979), and Prudence Realization Corp. v. Greist, 
316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942)); see also, e.g., Fairchild Dornier GmbH v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In 
re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 453 F.3d 225, 232 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Disallowance of a claim under § 502(b) 
is only appropriate when the claimant has no rights vis-a-vis the bankrupt, i.e., when there is ‘no basis in fact or 
law’ for any recovery from the debtor.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 
631 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990); In re Shelter Enters., 98 B.R. 224, 229 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (“Although the 
judgment notes appear both valid on their faces and enforceable by Owoc under applicable state law, it is the 
duty of this Court to look behind those judgments to the validity of the underlying claims . . . . State substantive 
law determines the existence of a claim.” (citation omitted)). 
 77  28 U.S.C. § 157(c), (e) (2012). 
 78  11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1)–(2) (2012).  
 79  In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 560–61 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997). 
 80  In re Texans CUSO Ins. Grp., LLC, 426 B.R. 194, 204 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010) (relying in part on 
Bittner v. Borne Chem. Co. Inc., 691 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 1982)); Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants v. 
Asbestos Prop. Damage Comm. (In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc.), 330 B.R. 133, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005) 
(citing for support Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000)). 
 81  In re Dow Corning Corp., 194 B.R. 121, 145 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996); see also In re Miami Trucolor 
Offset Serv. Co., 187 B.R. 767, 768 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (describing § 1126(a), § 502, and Rule 3018(a) as 
part of the same statutory framework). 
 82  See infra Part II.B. 
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statutory) link between Rule 3018(a) and § 502(c),83 the former allows a claim 
to be temporarily allowed, its validity assumed, “[n]otwithstanding objection to 
a claim or interest.”84  
Although estimation pursuant to Rule 3018(a) lies within the trial court’s 
“sound discretion,”85 at least two constraints on its invocation can be mined from 
its explicit text and scattered precedent. First, while “a temporary allowance 
order only arises if there is an objection to a claim,”86 the claim temporarily 
allowed must be, at worst, the subject of an “unresolved objection” under 
§ 502.87 Second, the “amount” pegged must be that “which the court deems 
proper for the purpose of accepting or rejecting a plan”88 as determined by 
utilizing “the method best suited to the circumstances of the case.”89 Regardless 
of what a purely economic analysis would indicate, estimation under Rule 
3018(a) must respect the “obvious and dominating purposes” of the Code’s 
reorganization chapters—a debtor’s timely reorganization and deserving 
creditors’ prompt pro rata repayment90—and the rationale posited for this 
particular safety valve: “[T]o prevent possible abuse by plan proponents who 
might ensure acceptance of a plan by filing last minute objections to the claims 
of dissenting creditor.”91 Inevitably, as elsewhere, courts consult the pertinent 
substantive law.92  
 
 83  See, e.g., Goldsmith v. LBM Fin. LLC (In re Loucheschi LLC), No. 11-42578-MSH, 2013 Bankr. 
LEXIS 4811, at *38–39 (Bankr. D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2013).  
 84  FED. R. BANKR. 3018(a). For a detailed discussion of this oft-mangled rule, see Shachmurove, Claims, 
supra note 46.  
 85  In re Lichtin/Wade LLC, No. 12-00845-8-RDD, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1719, at *7 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 
Apr. 26, 2013); accord In re Mangia Pizza Invs. LP, 480 B.R. 669, 679 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2012). 
 86  Armstrong v. Rushton (In re Armstrong), 294 B.R. 344, 354 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 97 F. App’x 
295 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 87  In re Pulp Finish 1 Co., No. 12-13775 (SMB), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 189, at *7 n.1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 16, 2014) (emphasis in original); accord Jacksonville Airport Inc. v. Michkeldel, Inc., 434 F.3d 729, 732 
(4th Cir. 2006); see also In re Motel Assocs. of Cincinnati, 50 B.R. 196, 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 88  FED. R. BANKR. 3018(a). 
 89  In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear, Inc., 197 B.R. 771, 775 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 90  In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff’d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 91  In re Armstrong, 294 B.R. at 354; see also, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Enron Corp., No. 04 
Civ. 5499 (HB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21810, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2004) (affirming bankruptcy court 
opinion, as it prevented a single creditor from “improperly control[ing] the vote and confirmation of the 
reorganization plan to the detriment of other creditors”).  
 92  See In re Bellucci, 119 B.R. 763, 777 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (in denying a motion for reconsideration 
of a sua sponte order to abstain, emphasizing that “[t]he fact of bankruptcy does not change the substantive law 
that applies to the merits of a claim” and justifying deferral to state appellate court as the relevant “objection to 
[a] claim relate[d] entirely to the underlying state law dispute, no federal question is presented”). 
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D. Nondischargeability of Claims under § 523(a)(2) 
With equal sureness, applicable non-bankruptcy law impacts the 
adjudication of the discharge exceptions encoded in § 523(a)(2). Both 
subsections prohibit a discharge pursuant to §§ 727,93 1141,94 1228(b),95 and 
1328(b)96 “for money property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing 
of credit, to the extent obtained by” one of two delineated misdeeds.97 The two 
subsections, “[i]t is well-established,” are mutually exclusive,98 though they 
share a purpose: both “retributive and protective,”99 “to prevent the dishonest 
debtor’s attempt to use the law’s protections to shield his or her wrongdoing,”100 
a hoary notion embedded in the very fabric of American bankruptcy law.101 Per 
Rule 7001, “a proceeding to determine the dischargeability of a debt” under 
§ 523(a)(2) is “[a]n adversary proceeding,”102 in which the creditor bears the 
burden of proof103 by a preponderance of the evidence.104 
1. Section 523(a)(2)(A) 
Pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(A), a debtor will not be discharged from any debt 
traceable to “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a 
 
 93  11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012). 
 94  Id. § 1141. 
 95  Id. § 1228(b). 
 96  Id. § 1328(c). 
 97  Id. § 523(a)(2); see, e.g., Gertsch v. Johnson & Johnson (In re Gertsch), 237 B.R. 160, 167 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. 1999); Siriani v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re Siriani), 967 F.2d 302, 304 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 98  McCrary v. Barrack (In re Barrack), 217 B.R. 598, 605 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); accord, e.g., Land Inv. 
Club, Inc. v. Lauer (In re Lauer), 371 F.3d 406, 413 (8th Cir. 2004); Eugene Parks Law Corp. Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 99  Century 21 Balfour Real Estate v. Menna (In re Menna), 16 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis in 
original). 
 100  In re Gans, 75 B.R. 474, 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re 
Newmark, 20 B.R. 842, 852 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982)); accord, e.g., Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 
1322 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow an honest but unfortunate debtor to 
get a fresh start. . . . A dishonest debtor, on the other hand, will not benefit from his wrongdoing.” (citations 
omitted) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991), and Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Eashai (In re 
Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996)); In re Union Bank, 127 B.R. 514, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting 
In re Gans, 75 B.R. at 481).  
 101  Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 374–75 (2007); Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 706 (1877); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (“The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately 
connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property 
may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 102  FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6); Greene v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 770 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 103  FED. R. BANKR. P. 4005; Hathaway v. OSB Mfg., Inc. (In re Hathaway), 364 B.R. 220, 231 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2007). 
 104  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991). 
SHACHMUROVE GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:41 PM 
478 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition.”105 Whether 
the misdeed alleged is deemed a pretense, a misrepresentation, or a fraud,106 
courts typically require proof of the same four elements: (1) the debtor made a 
representation; (2) this representation was false and the debtor knew of its falsity 
at the time of its making; (3) the creditor actually and justifiably relied upon the 
debtor’s representation; and (4) the creditor sustained a loss or was proximately 
damaged as a result of that representation.107 In four distinct ways, this standard, 
unmistakably lodged within the Code’s statutory corpus, incorporates non-
bankruptcy law.  
First, while affirmative misrepresentations are often involved in actions 
under § 523(a)(2)(A), a debt may also be deemed nondischargeable under this 
subsection on the basis of a debtor’s “concealment or fraudulent omission of a 
material fact.”108 It is, indeed, widely accepted “that silence, or concealment of 
a material fact, can be the basis of a false impression which creates a 
misrepresentation actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A).”109 When omissions are at 
issue, the crucial question is whether “the debtor was under a duty to disclose 
and possessed an intent to deceive.”110 Such a duty to disclose “facts basic to the 
transaction,” in turn, arises if the debtor “knows that the other is about to enter 
into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship 
between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would 
reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.”111 Simply put, “customs of trade” 
and “other objective circumstances,” both external sources of legal guidance as 
to a concrete duty’s delineation, may play a critical role in defining a legal duty’s 
existence and thereby the debtor’s liability for his or her silent breach under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B).112 To divine either, non-bankruptcy law must be consulted. 
 
 105  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 106  Though phrased in the disjunctive, many have seen the terms “false pretenses” and “false 
representation” as equivalent to “actual fraud,” the former two therefore not amounting to separate grounds for 
a debt’s nondischaregability. E.g., Mandalay Resort Grp. v. Miller (In re Miller), 310 B.R. 185, 188–189 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2004) (so characterizing Ninth Circuit law). Purely as a matter of statutory interpretation, this choice 
remains a dubious one. 
 107  George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325, 332–33 (1997). 
 108  Huskey v. Tolman (In re Tolman), 491 B.R. 138, 151 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013). 
 109  Stennis v. Davis (In re Davis), 486 B.R. 182, 191 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2013). 
 110  Apte v. Japra (In re Apte), 96 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 111  Id. at 1324 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1976)). Tellingly, in Field v. Mans, the 
Supreme Court turned to this same section of the Restatement to define the reliance required under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A). Id. (“The Supreme Court in Field looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976) as ‘the 
most widely accepted distillation of the common law of torts’ at the relevant time.”).  
 112  See Cutcliff v. Reuter (In re Reuter), 427 B.R. 727, 744 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010).  
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Second, so as to establish the requisite “intent to deceive” under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A), courts look towards those omnipresent “badges of fraud,” a type 
of circumstantial evidence often needed due to the rarity of a debtor admitting 
to the possession of a fraudulent motive.113 Among the plethora of such indicia 
recognized by sundry courts,114 “[f]or purposes of § 523(a)(2)(A), a common 
badge of fraud concerns whether a defendant made any effort to perform their 
obligation.”115 Furthermore, “the greater the extent of a debtor’s performance, 
the less likely it will be that they possessed an intent to defraud.”116 Naturally 
and logically, then, the source of a debtor’s obligation will not be the Code but 
the contract that the debtor signed—and the operative law applicable to such 
contracts and transactions, most especially any obligations and duties that it 
thrust as a matter of course on the prepetition debtor. As such, federal or state 
common and statutory law must be consulted for a party’s contractual duties to 
be precisely denoted and, if a violation thereby be found, a pivotal badge be 
established.117 
Third, demarcating the outer boundaries of justifiable reliance may 
occasionally, albeit not invariably, require dissection of such non-bankruptcy 
law. Unlike § 523(a)(2)(B), § 523(a)(2)(A) specifies no standard, and due to this 
presumptively intentional exclusion of such language in the latter, the Court has 
imputed a “justifiable reliance” requirement to § 523(a)(2)(A).118 
“Justification,” the Court noted, “is a matter of the qualities and characteristics 
of the particular plaintiff, and the circumstances of the particular case.”119 
Nonetheless, if the relevant facts should have been discerned by the creditor—
“a person cannot purport to rely on preposterous representations or close his eyes 
 
 113  Caspers v. Van Horne (In re Van Horne), 823 F.2d 1285, 1287 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 114  See Lisa Ng v. Adler (In re Adler), 494 B.R. 43, 65–66 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (enumerating six for 
purposes of § 727(a)(2)(A)). 
 115  Bartson v. Marroquin (In re Marroquin), 441 B.R. 586, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010). 
 116  Ewing v. Bissonette (In re Bissonette), 398 B.R. 189, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008). 
 117  See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28 (1977) (holding that when a federal statute governs, 
“[t]he necessity of uniformity of decision demands that federal common law, rather than state law, control the 
contract’s interpretation”); Visteon Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 777 F.3d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 
2015) (citing Indiana’s uniform-contract-interpretation approach, “which applies the law of a single state to the 
whole contract even though [the contract] covers multiple risks in multiple states” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 118  Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61 (1995). 
 119  Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1976)); 
see also, e.g., Vermont Plastics v. Brine, Inc., 79 F.3d 272, 277–78 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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to avoid discovery of the truth”120—blind reliance will not be justifiable 
reliance.121  
This understanding of “justifiable reliance” is rooted in “the common law of 
torts”; to this external law, courts have repeatedly turned to establish the limits 
of justifiability.122 Based on this substantial precedent, the extent to which an 
allegedly wronged party’s reliance was justifiable will frequently depend on the 
nature of the parties’ contractual agreement and the applicable non-bankruptcy 
law which governs its interpretation.123 Reflecting a tendency that further 
justifies this approach, courts have not hesitated to rely on state common and 
statutory law in applying § 523(a)(2) to a particular debtor,124 as they have often 
done in regards to any substantive legal issue not expressly and fully settled by 
the Code’s positive text.125 In sum, however unintentional the result, 
nonbankruptcy law, as written and interpreted, must often inform any analysis 
of justifiable reliance.126 Logic compels no less, as only from its substantive 
content can the outer bounds which no person of the same age, experience, 
sophistication, education, and capacity as the alleged creditor can claim to have 
rightly crossed can be espied.  
Finally, any calculation of damages demands an analysis identical to that 
necessary to estimate a claim. By necessity, if a creditor prevails on a 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) action, a court must estimate the claim’s size.127 To make that 
 
 120  Romesh Japa, M.D., F.A.C.C., Inc. v. Apte (In re Apte), 180 B.R. 223, 229 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eugene Parks Law Corp. Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Kirsh (In 
re Kirsh), 973 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1992)), cited with approval, Citibank (S.D.) N.A. v. Eashai (In re 
Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 121  Am. Express Centurion Bank v. Owens (In re Owens), No. 12-19125-B-7, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 5146, 
at *17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2013) (summarizing precedent and collecting cases). 
 122  Huskey v. Tolman (In re Tolman), 491 B.R. 138, 152 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013). 
 123  See, e.g., Walid v. Yolanda for Irene Couture, 40 A.3d 85, 91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012); Butler 
v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010); Toy v. Metro Life Ins., Co., 928 A.2d 186, 207–08 (Pa. 2007); Moore 
v. Daw, No. CT 95-20, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3763, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1996); Koral Indus. v. 
Sec. Conn. Life Ins., Co., 802 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1990); Keywell Corp. v. Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 164 (2d 
Cir. 1994); Smith v. Ethell, 494 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill App. Ct. 1986); Hartong v. Partak, Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 
942, 964–65 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
 124  See, e.g., Bancboston Mortg. Corp. v. Ledford, 127 B.R. 175, 184–85 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1991) 
(relying on Tennessee law regarding when fraud may be imputed to a partner and collecting similar cases). 
 125  Daniel A. Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendment: An Uncertain Boundary 
Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 383, 395 (2007). 
 126  Cf. INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL IACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL SALES AND CONTRACT 
LAW 396 (2012). 
 127  E.g., Baker Dev. Corp. v. Mulder (In re Mulder), 307 B.R. 637, 641 n.5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004) (“A 
bankruptcy court can enter a money judgment in a nondischargeability action.”); Cowen v. Kennedy (In re 
Kennedy), 108 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the bankruptcy court acted within its jurisdiction 
in entering a monetary judgment against . . . [the debtor] in conjunction with a finding that the debt was non-
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accurate determination, especially if punitive damages may be claimed as a 
matter of law, courts have long looked to the non-bankruptcy law governing the 
relevant transaction that begot the debt already found non-dischargeable per 
§ 523(a)(2)(A).128  
2. Section 523(a)(2)(B) 
Seen simultaneously as an amendment and a codification of existing law,129 
§ 523(a)(2)(B)130 forecloses the discharge of a debt upon the establishment of 
seven elements: (1) “use of a statement in writing” that was (2) “material” and 
(3) “false,” (4) “respecting a debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition,” (5) 
“on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable . . . reasonably relied,” (6) 
“that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive,”131 and 
(7) that proximately caused damages to the complaining creditor.132 As a federal 
statute, non-bankruptcy law may affect this section’s interpretation in three 
ways.  
First, and maybe most clearly, “[r]easonable reliance is an objective test 
requiring conduct consistent with the standard of a reasonable man,”133 the term 
effectively “connot[ing] the use of the standard of ordinary and average 
person.”134 Logically, if a controlling law or a written agreement forecloses the 
possibility of reliance during a specified class of transactions, “a community 
standard of conduct”135 such as that encoded in § 523(a)(2)(B) would 
automatically categorize such reliance as unreasonable, making proof of 
nondischargeability impossible. Similarly, if a contract defines the outer bounds 
 
dischargeable” under § 523(a)(2)(A)); N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1508 (7th Cir. 
1991) (“We think it preferable to allow bankruptcy courts ruling on the dischargeability of a debt to adjudicate 
the issues of liability and damages also.”). If the case involved a denial of discharge predicated on § 727, no 
need to compute damages would exist. See Genesee Reg’l Bank v. Rinaudo (In re Rinaudo), 418 B.R. 42, 47 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 128  See, e.g., Klaus v. Thompson (In re Klaus), 181 B.R. 487, 492 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (looking to 
California law regarding the awarding of punitive damages). 
 129  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 130 (1977) (“Current law provides a nearly identical exception to discharge. 
The differences are that current law does not cover a debt for services, and requires only reliance, not reasonable 
reliance, by the creditor on the statement.”). 
 130  For ease, this section first discusses paragraph (B) rather than (A). 
 131  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(i)–(iv) (2012). 
 132  Candland v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Candland), 90 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1996) (rewording 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) and citing Siriani v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. (In re Siriani), 967 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
 133  Res GA Two, LLC v. Hiett (In re Hiett), No. 12-80560-DHW, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4179, at *22 (Bankr. 
M.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2014). 
 134  City Bank & Trust Co. v. Vann (In re Vann), 67 F.3d 277, 280 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 135  Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 71 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 545A, Comment b (2nd 
1979)). 
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of reliance by assigning the relevant burden to the objecting creditor or by either 
stating or importing a very narrow definition from an external legal scheme, “the 
ordinary and average person” would not be able to maintain the reasonableness 
of their reliance on a debtor’s representations.  
Second, because “[t]he concept of ‘materiality’ . . . includes objective and 
subjective components,”136 whether a financial statement is “materially false,” 
meaning “that [it] paints a substantially untruthful picture of the debtor’s 
financial condition . . . [i.e.,] a significant understatement of liabilities or 
exaggeration of assets,”137 may often depend on what non-bankruptcy law 
allows a contracting party to assume to be true or obliges the debtor to verify or 
vouchsafe. If so, then a debtor’s reckless representation regarding his or her 
financial ability to satisfy such elements may readily satisfy § 523(a)(2)(B)’s 
materiality requirement.  
Finally, damages must always “be proven with specificity and cannot be 
speculative or conjectural.”138 Accordingly, as with estimation under § 502 or 
Rule 3018(a),139 once a claim is found to be non-dischargeable per 
§ 523(a)(2)(B), a court must turn to the relevant contract or controlling law to 
peg an appropriate amount. For these four reasons, non-bankruptcy strictures 
once more play a pivotal role in a discharge subsection’s construal in a specific 
case or proceeding.140 
E. Caveat: Multiplying Universes 
Of course, the foregoing points to only a handful of those instances in which 
external law governs substantive decisions otherwise bounded by the Code’s 
explicit provisions. Others, in fact, can be found, including, for example, 
§ 503(b)(9). More importantly, even where no such explicit referral appears, the 
underlying principles behind such non-bankruptcy provisions can (and often do) 
influence a court’s interpretive approach, impelling subtle methodological 
variations, in a protean host of unpredictable cases. To wit, sometime, even when 
no definite answer can be gleaned from the relevant compendium, the law’s 
spirit gives some direction and excludes certain possibilities by implication. As 
 
 136  Fairfax State Sav. Bank v. McCleary (In re McCleary), 284 B.R. 876, 885 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2002) 
(citing Ramsey Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dammen (In re Dammen), 167 B.R. 545, 551 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1994)). 
 137  Guaranty Residential Lending, Inc. v. Koep (In re Koep), 334 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005). 
 138  Huskey v. Tolman (In re Tolman), 491 B.R. 138, 156 n.43 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013); cf. Jill Stuart (Asia) 
LLC v. Sanei Int’l Co., 566 F. App’x 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing contract damages under New York law). 
 139  See supra Part III.A.1–2. 
 140  Cf. Steven W. Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 
67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 294 (1993). 
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shown below, CISG, a treaty shockingly opaque as to certain issues but 
surprisingly exhaustive as to others, may have precisely such an effect.141 
III. CONSTRUCTION OF TREATIES GENERALLY AND CISG PARTICULARLY 
A. General Rules 
As with a statute142 and a rule,143 a treaty’s interpretation begins with its 
language.144 “[C]lear treaty language” and hence plain and unambiguous 
meaning145 is dispositive “absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence.”146 
Subject to this generally applicable paradigm, treaty interpretation initially 
makes use of numerous semantic and syntactic precepts, including the expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius,147 noscitur a sociis,148 ejusdem generis,149 and 
absurdity150 canons and the last antecedent151 and series qualifier152 rules, and 
 
 141  See Hawkins & Maffett-Nickelman, supra note 30, at 45. 
 142  Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 235, 243, 245–46 (2010); United 
States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
 143  Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 527–31. 
 144  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 145  The definitional differences between the terms “plain” and “unambiguous” often relies on an assiduous 
attentiveness to the distinction between denotation and connotation. Amir Shachmurove, Sherlock’s Admonition: 
Vindicatory Contempts as Criminal Actions for Purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 362, 13 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. 
L.J. 67, 77–78 (2014) [hereinafter Shachmurove, Sherlock]. 
 146  Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (“When the parties to a treaty both 
agree as to the meaning of a treaty provision, and that interpretation follows from the clear treaty language, we 
must, absent extraordinarily strong contrary evidence, defer to that interpretation.”); accord Forestal Guarani 
S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 147  POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) (citing Setser v. United States, 
566 U.S. 231, 461–62 (explaining the canon, which stands for the proposition that when one or more things of 
a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded)). 
 148  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008) (narrowing the range of permissible means by 
use of “the commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis—which counsels that a word is given more precise content 
by the neighboring words with which it is associated”). 
 149  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 294 (2011) (defining the canon of ejusdem 
generis, “which limits general terms [that] follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified” (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 150  Kolon Indus. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 160, 180 n.2 (4th Cir. 2014) (Shedd, J., 
dissenting) (“The absurdity canon allows courts to disregard the statutory text when adhering to the text ‘would 
result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve’.” (marks in original) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 234 (2012))). 
 151  United States v. Kerley, 416 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Under the last antecedent rule, a limiting 
clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 152  United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he series-qualifier canon, contradicts 
the last-antecedent canon; it provides that a modifier at the beginning or end of a series of terms modifies all the 
terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 235 (2013). 
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the familiar contextual canons, such as the prefatory materials,153 in pari 
materia,154 and general/specific155 canons, the presumption of consistent 
usage,156 and the rule against redundancy,157 so important in the most anodyne 
exercises of statutory construction.158  
Broadly viewed, this multipart exegesis focuses on the relevant phrase’s 
standard denotation and connotation, the relevant text’s grammatical structure, 
comparison with similar terms used throughout the particular treaty, and the 
instrument’s more general context, including any evidence of intent such as its 
known and obvious purposes.159 To the extent a treaty’s language is plain and 
unambiguous, distinct if often amalgamated facets,160 as ascertained by use of 
 
 153  Wiggins Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 88 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1981) (“In the 
construction of the Constitution of the United States, statutes and regulations, the federal rule permits and 
requires consideration of preambles in appropriate cases.”). 
 154  Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ., 746 F.3d 1135, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that, 
as a general rule, statutes in pari materia should be construed together to ascertain the meaning and intent of 
each). 
 155  RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“The general/specific 
canon is perhaps most frequently applied to statutes in which a general permission or prohibition is contradicted 
by a specific prohibition or permission. To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision is construed as an 
exception to the general one.”). 
 156  United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1417 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (defining the 
presumption as “the rule of thumb that a term generally means the same thing each time it is used”). 
 157  Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[S]tatutes should be 
construed to avoid holding language to be redundant.”). 
 158  Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 709 (1998). 
 159  Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10, 20 (2010) (consulting the “text and structure” of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to define the phrase “righ[t] of custody” and 
further reinforcing its interpretation based on this treaty’s “objects and purposes”); see also Maximov v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) (“[I]t is particularly inappropriate for a court to sanction a deviation from the 
clear import of a solemn treaty between this Nation and a foreign sovereign, when, as here, there is no indication 
that application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with 
the intent or expectations of its signatories.”); Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1292 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This 
Court’s duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a treaty . . . should make us reluctant to deem treaty 
terms, or terms used in other important international agreements, as surplusage.” (internal citation omitted)). The 
Court has defended the use of a “uniform, text-based approach” as critical to “ensur[ing] international 
consistency in interpreting the Convention.” Abbott, 560 U.S. at 12. 
 160  See Stern v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R. 58, 64–65 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
2013) (exploring the connection and distinction); Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 528–31 (same). 
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these motley rules of thumb,161 courts have no power to amend,162 harshness and 
unreason (short of patent absurdity) be damned.163 
Nonetheless, because treaties are different than the typical federal statute in 
origination and purpose, representing both “the law of this land” and “an 
agreement among sovereign powers,”164 otherwise atypical sources of 
interpretive guidance may be used to dispel ambiguity and to select the perfectly 
apposite plain and unambiguous import of a particular provision. Indeed, “courts 
[may] look to [such] extrinsic sources to aid in the interpretation of a treaty even 
with a relatively low level of ambiguity.”165 These interpretive aids include: (1) 
“the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty,”166 (2) “the post[-]ratification 
understanding of signatory nations,”167 (3) the reasonable view of a provision’s 
meaning espoused by the executive branch agencies charged with the treaty’s 
negotiation and/or enforcement,168 (4) the interpretations of other nations’ 
 
 161  See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 381 (2013); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 
249, 253–54 (1992). 
 162  Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989); see also The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 
71 (1821) (“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or 
trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial functions.”). 
 163  See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005); Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 
(1984); Edwards v. Valero Refining-Merauc, LLC, No. 3:14-CV-00772-JWD-EWD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9898, at *14 (M.D. La. Jan. 28, 2016). 
 164  Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996). 
 165  Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 878 (9th Cir. 2010) (Otero, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 3874 (2011). 
 166  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (relying on Zicherman 
v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)); see also, e.g., Bishop v. Reno, 210 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (“In construing treaties, we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the 
negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988))), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 897 (2000). 
 167  Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui 
Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1996) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (finding “the 
opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable weight”)); see also Schroeder v. Lufthansa 
German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is well established that treaty interpretation involves 
a consideration of legislative history and the intent of the contracting parties.”) (quoting Maugnie v. Compagnie 
Nat’l France, 549 F. 2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 168  Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982) (relying on Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 
U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (“While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments 
of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.”)); see also, 
e.g., McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 
176 at 184–85, and giving “great weight to the fact that the United States shares” a particular view regarding a 
treaty’s meaning). 
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courts,169 and (5) scholarly commentaries.170 Beyond these sources, the so-called 
“rule of equality” prohibits implementing statutory law that renders any treaty 
term nugatory.171 Hence, for most treaties, while a court must begin “with the[ir] 
text . . . and the context in which the written words are used,”172 a more liberal 
interpretive scheme than the one applicable to statutes controls.173  
B. CISG’s Domestic Status  
1. Preeminence 
With trade having “always been an incentive for harmoni[z]ing or unifying 
law,”174 CISG represents the culmination of decades of labor.175 This stunningly 
successful treaty sought to “contribute to the removal of legal barriers in . . . and 
promote the development of international trade”176 and has been described as 
“arguably the greatest legislative achievement aimed at harmonizing the 
international law of sales,”177 enjoying “widespread acceptance as the governing 
law of contracts for international trade.”178 A self-executing treaty179 that creates 
 
 169  Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 537 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226–28 (1996)). 
 170  Roser Technologies, Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129242, 
at *13–14 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013) (relying in part on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 
(1992)). 
 171  Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1803), amended on other grounds, 265 U.S. 332. 
 172  Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988) (quoting Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)). 
 173  Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991)). 
 174  Schwenzer et al., supra note 126, at 427. 
 175  See, e.g., H. Allen Blair, Hard Cases under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A 
Proposed Taxonomy of Interpretive Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 275 (2011); Christopher 
Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and a 
Proposal for a New Uniform Global Code in International Sales Law, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461, 
469 (2007). 
 176  CISG pmbl., art. I(1)(a); Honey Holdings I, Ltd. v. Alfred L. Wolff, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 543, 551 (S.D. 
Tex. 2015) (quoting id.).  
 177  David Frisch, Commercial Common Law, the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 501 (1999); see also Marcia J. Staff, United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Lessons Learned from Five Years of Cases, 6 S.C. 
J. INT’L L & BUS. 1, 3 (2009) (describing CISG as “one of the most successful international conventions 
promulgated by the United Nations”). 
 178  Jeffrey R. Hartwig, Note, Schmitz-Werke GMBH & Co. v. Rockland Industries, Inc. and the United 
Nations Convention on Contractions for the International Sale of Goods (CISG): Diffidence and Developing 
International Legal Norms, 22 J. L. & COM. 77, 98 (2003). 
 179  VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., Nos. 13–1799, 13–1697, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS, 
6692, at *18 (7th Cir. Apr. 10, 2014) (quoting Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 
894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing CISG as “a self-executing agreement between the United States and other 
SHACHMUROVE GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:41 PM 
2018] CISG AS THE MEASURE OF A CLAIM’S VALUE 487 
a private right of action in all federal courts,180 an understanding at least partly 
based on CISG’s legislative history and its commercial subject-matter,181 any 
action based on a CISG provision squarely falls within the federal courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction.182 Pursuant to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, moreover, 
any properly enacted treaty constitutes “the supreme Law of the Land . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding,”183 so that CISG is as much a part of every state’s law as the 
Constitution itself.184 In light of these facts, if CISG does indeed apply to a 
 
signatories”)); Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. Civ. No. 10-05321, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, at *18–19 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012) (“The CISG is a self-executing treaty that preempts 
contrary provisions of article 2 of the UCC and other state contract law to the extent that those causes of action 
fall within the scope of the CISG.”); Delchi Carrier v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(affirming district court decision that treated CISG as self-executing); cf, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 
505 n.2 (2008) (“What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal 
law upon ratification.”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933) (“For in a strict sense the [t]reaty was 
self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.”); 
see also, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 
922, 959, 989 (2004); James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
273, 281, 304 (1999). If it was not self-executing, CISG would lack domestic effect in the absence of 
implementing legislation. At least some scholars have theorized that this fact explains United States courts’ 
haphazard treatment of CISG. Kina Grbic, Putting the CISG Where it Belongs: In the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 29 TOURO L. REV. 173, 191 (2012). 
 180  Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), cited in Profi-
Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358(PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014). 
 181  Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150–52 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Bailey, 
supra note 179, at 281. 
 182  28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2014); see, e.g., ECEM Europa Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite Co., 451 F. App’x 
73, 79 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]f . . . the CISG (an international treaty) governs the dispute, then we may treat the 
dispute as a federal question.”); Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema, 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(concluding CISG applied and federal subject matter jurisdiction therefore existed over an action for breach of 
contract); BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that per § 1331(a) “CISG . . . creates a private right of action in federal court”). This fact has led 
one judge to discount the potential difficulties of interpreting and applying CISG specifically. Taub v. Marchesi 
Di Barolo S.P.A., No. 09-CV-599 (ADS)(ETB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115565, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 
2009) (Spatt, J.); Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 53-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Spatt, J.). 
Of course, as this jurisdictional grant does not appear to be exclusive but rather concurrent, no constitutional 
stricture necessarily forecloses state courts from ruling on CISG. Alstine, supra note 158, at 690 & n.13. 
 183  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472–73 (2013); JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1832 (1833) (“In regard to treaties, there is equal reason, why 
they should be held, when made, to be the supreme law of the land. . . . [T]reaties constitute solemn compacts 
of binding obligation among nations . . . . [T]hey ought to have a positive binding efficacy as laws upon all the 
states, and all the citizens of the states.”). 
 184  Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 490 (1880); accord Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 
346 (2006) (“is well established that a self-executing treaty binds the States pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, 
and that the States therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in the course of adjudicating the rights of 
litigants.”); Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (emphasizing 
that CISG, like the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, is “state law”); 
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prepetition contract between two or more parties, one of whom later assumes a 
debtor’s mantle, its provisions automatically preempt any contrary state law 
such as the UCC185 or any federal statute enacted prior to its effective date of 
January 1, 1988.186 Only to the Constitution187 and a later federal law188 can 
CISG be inferior.189 Despite U.S. courts’ seeming reluctance to invoke it,190 
 
see also, e.g., Alstine, supra note 179, at 901, 920; Sunil R. Harjani, The Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods in United States Courts, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49, 53 (2000); Arthur Rosett, Critical 
Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 265, 301 (1984). Thus, CISG can never be deemed “foreign law” that must be raised in accordance with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1, though one appellate court strangely concluded 
otherwise in 1996, Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., 94 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished 
disposition). 
 185  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 237 (1796) (“It is the declared will of the people 
of the United States that every treaty made, by the authority of the United States, shall be superior to the 
Constitution and laws of any individual State.”); see also, e.g., It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft 
mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149, at *46–47 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) (holding that, if 
CISG controlled, Pennsylvania law was fully preempted); Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7288, at *12–13 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013) (reaching the same conclusion as to plaintiff’s 
state law contract claims); BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 336 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that CISG creates a private right of action in federal court); Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. 
Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 480 n.7 (D.N.J. 2005) (noting that the CISG preempts state contract law to the 
extent that state causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 
209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that under the Supremacy Clause, the CISG would displace 
any contrary state sales law such as the UCC’s article 2). 
 186  Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, (1888) (“By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same 
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. . . . [I]f the two are inconsistent, the one last in 
date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.”); accord 
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion)). 
The Senate ratified CISG on October 9, 1986, setting an effective date of January 1, 1988, and the United States 
deposited its ratification at the United Nations on December 11, 1986. Bailey, supra note 179, at 279. 
 187  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957); see also, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Alstine, 
supra note 179, at 950. Whether the Constitution places limited on federalism in the course of implementing a 
legal treaty via statute remains an open question, left unresolved by the most recent Court case within this 
particular field. 
 188  Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194, cited in Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 426–27 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 
id. for “the last in time rule that, if a statute and treaty are inconsistent, then the last in time will prevail”), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000); see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d 
230, 233–34 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (reiterating the rule). 
 189  Bailey, supra note 179, at 284. In all other cases, “CISG automatically applies to international sales 
contracts between parties from different contracting states unless the parties agree to exclude [its] application.” 
Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 3972 (LTS)(JCF), 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110716, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., Ltd. v. Microflock Textile Grp. Corp., No. 06-CV-
22608(JJO), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40418 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2008)). Consequently, in the case of a true and 
irresolvable conflict between the earlier adopted Code and later ratified CISG, the Code would have to give.  
 190  Shani Salama, Pragmatic Responses to Interpretive Impediments: Article 7 of the CISG, an Inter-
American Application, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 225, 231 (2006–07). 
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CISG’s coverage is seen as far-reaching,191 its every article imbued with the full 
“preemptive force of federal law.”192  
2. Caveats about Utility of Domestic Case Law in CISG Cases 
Prior to any attempted construction of a CISG article by court or 
commentator, four sematic signs must be minded. 
First, the Court’s approach to treaty exposition does not necessarily cohere 
with scholars’ understanding of CISG’s interpretive template. In fact, as to 
treaties like CISG that regulate conduct between private entities and implicate 
no foreign policy or sovereignty concerns, there may be “no reason,” as the 
Court has done,193 “to give controlling deference to the intent of the contracting 
parties or the views of the Executive Branch in interpreting . . . [their] 
substantive provisions.”194 Nonetheless, binding precedent leaves no room for 
the utilization of other theories, and any objection, however valid it may seem, 
cannot be sustained unless the Court itself interposes a newer and more apt 
model. In addition, despite scholarly insistence to the contrary,195 the Court’s 
tiered approach—plain text, then structure, then purpose as evidenced by a 
panoply of sources196—and its utilization of a wide array of sources appears to 
conform to the interpretive scheme established in CISG’s seventh article.197 In 
 
 191  It’s Intoxicating, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149, at *47; see also MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. 
v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Despite the CISG’s broad scope, 
surprisingly few cases have applied the Convention in the United States.” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 526 
U.S. 1087 (1999). 
 192  Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, No. 05–CV–650, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45003, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 
16, 2005); accord, e.g., Stawski Distrib. Co. v. Zywiec Breweries PLC, No. 02 C 8708, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17676, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 
(N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 193  See supra Part IV.A.  
 194  Alstine, supra note 158, at 708; Grbic, supra note 179, at 192 n.132. CISG’s article 7, for one, “rejects 
the restrictive approach that is evidence in much of the recent Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence.” Alstine, 
supra note 158, at 757. 
 195  Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano (Italy), 12 July 
2000, NS Vol. 6, Uniform Law Review / Revue de Droit Uniforme, 203, 205–06 (2001). 
 196  Alstine, supra note 179, at 982; Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 
24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 207 (1994). 
 197  E.g., Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Uniform International Sales Law and the Global 
Jurisconsultorium, 24 J. L. & COM. 159, 165 (2005); Bailey, supra note 179, at 297; Alstine, supra note 158, at 
753; Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction of Uniform Law, 
29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1996) see also Harjani, supra note 184, at 61 (enumerating seven sources in 
descending importance: “(1) general principles of contract law contained in the CISG; (2) the legislative history 
of the CISG; (3) case law from foreign jurisdictions interpreting the Convention; (4) treatises and commentary 
of noted scholars on the CISG; (5) general principles of private international law; (6) case law from domestic 
jurisdictions interpreting the Convention; and (7) case law from domestic jurisdictions interpreting domestic 
sales law”). Consideration of each source therein identified is perfectly customary as a matter of domestic treaty 
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effect, then, any U.S. judge who interprets CISG pursuant to the Court’s 
dominant model will often find itself acting consistently with CISG’s 
unambiguous directives,198 if not necessarily with the kind of utmost regard for 
its implicit and contestable interpretive exhortations demanded by many 
international law experts.199 
Second, a problem rooted in common law systems’ preference for decisions 
based on precedent200 may also stymie any judicial interpreter. Within the 
domestic arena, CISG’s already “vague” and “relatively abstract” 
phraseology201 has led to the emergence of an oft-disparaged “homeward trend” 
in certain nations.202 Influenced by this potent predilection, federal and state 
courts throughout the United States continue to rely on UCC case law, assert the 
virtual absence of CISG case law, and exhibit an almost complete disregard for 
CISG cases decided by foreign courts.203 Consequently, as “a majority of courts 
[have] look[ed] across federal jurisdictions for guidance in dealing with cases of 
first impression,”204 initial errata have often been duplicated, with the United 
States decried as one of the “leading countries in misapplications of the 
Convention’s provisions.”205 This fact should not be overlooked when CISG’s 
 
interpretation. And it is by no means clear that CISG requires such a ranking. See Bailey, supra note 179, at 
293–94 (“[W]hile the Convention’s requirement that decisions from other jurisdictions be considered is clear, 
just how much significance a court should attach to those decisions is.”). 
 198  See Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 487–88. In practice, U.S. courts have often strayed. 
 199  Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1033. Whether bankruptcy’s oddities may yet allow for the harmonization 
of these discordant strands is an interesting question worthy of further exploration, but beyond this Article’s 
purview.  
 200  William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and Unmodified), 60 LA. L. 
REV. 677, 701 (1999–2000) (“A major difference between the civil law and common law is that priority in civil 
law is given to doctrine (including the codifiers’ reports) over jurisprudence, while the opposite is true in the 
common law.”). In part, CISG’s drafters hoped to “harmoniz[e] civil and common law jurisprudence.” Sarah 
Howard Jenkins, Construing the Laws Governing International and U.S. Domestic Contracts for the Sale of 
Goods: A Comparative Evaluation of the CISG and the UCC, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 181, 183 (2012); 
accord Camilla Andersen, The Global Jurisconsultorium of the CISG Revisited, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. 
L. & ARB. 43, 45 (2009). 
 201  Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen 
Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 311 (2004). 
 202  Salama, supra note 190, at 250. 
 203  Staff, supra note 177, at 15. 
 204  Michael F. Sturley, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: Will a Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 540, 542 (1986); see also, e.g., Marlyse McQuillen, 
Note, The Development of a Federal CISG Common Law in U.S. Courts: Patterns of Interpretation and Citation, 
61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 511 (2006); Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Interpretive Challenge to Uniformity, 15 
J.L. & COM. 175, 176 (1995). 
 205  Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 477; accord Bailey, supra note 179, at 275 (“Despite the CISG’s political 
and economic significance to the United States, for the past decade, U.S. courts and attorneys have overlooked, 
misconstrued, and misapplied the terms of the Convention.”). Other, less charged reasons may explain this 
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domestic precedent is perused for aid in the explication of a specific CISG 
provision, for the likelihood of an original error is greater than in normal cases 
of a purely domestic law’s interpretation.  
Third, encomia aside,206 CISG’s flaws as a document and a body of law are 
legion.207 Honestly explicated, CISG’s articles provide only “very general, 
vague default rules tied to the concept of reasonableness”;208 consequently, its 
methodology of interpretation is itself ambiguous.209 The lack of any official 
commentary or any comment within CISG itself about the “role, if any, 
contemplated for authoritative judicial interpretation,”210 interjects further doubt 
about the rightful weight of any precedent, whether foreign or domestic, 
scholars’ complaints notwithstanding. Just as significantly, certain terms, from 
the prosaic, such as article 3’s definition of “goods,” to the more hortatory, such 
as article 7’s “general principles” and “international character,” are not well-
defined.211  
In fact, so many principles critical for the delineation of parties’ duties—
“fundamental breach,” “reasonable time,” and “good faith,” among the most 
significant—are expressly espoused but ambiguously delineated, CISG’s 
interpretation an often “daunting” task.212 Compounding the problem, although 
CISG mandates the employment of general principles in unclear cases, it 
specifies “very few principles,” making it a “poor guide for those faced with the 
concrete task of giving meaning to the words.”213 These noted details cannot but 
compel an assiduous attention to CISG’s precise and ratified text, thereby 
obviating the need to rely on an often incoherent international jurisprudence,214 
except as to those ambiguous articles upon which a decided juridical and 
scholarly consensus has settled. As such, for all the vociferous disparagement of 
 
apparent pattern, including CISG “relative newness” and the “lack of utilization . . . by contracting parties.” 
Lopez, supra note 117, at 155. 
 206  JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 1 (2d ed. 2004). 
 207  See Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Selling Goods Internationally: Scope of the U.N. Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 17 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 657, 660–61 (2008) (enumerating 
four of the more prominent weaknesses). 
 208  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 320. 
 209  Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 487–495. 
 210  Rosett, supra note 184, at 297. 
 211  See Bailey, supra note 179, at 287, 291, 309. 
 212  Blair, supra note 175, at 313–14; Bailey, supra note 179, at 295. 
 213  Rosett, supra note 184, at 299. 
 214  Cf. Salama, supra note 190, at 250 (noting that article 7(2)’s prominent shortcomings include “the 
absence of a common and comprehensive understanding of the meaning of ‘general principles’”); Hartnell, supra 
note 17, at 7 (describing article 4(a)’s validity exception as “a particular danger to the development of a coherent 
jurisprudence of international trade”).  
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American courts’ parochial penchants, the only form of CISG interpretation that 
is both reasonable and defensible in light of such international disagreement over 
issues large and small corresponds strikingly well with American precedent.215 
Lastly, the real state of CISG case law within the domestic arena is 
debatable. To this day, U.S. tribunals repeat the old saw that “[t]here is little case 
law interpreting the CISG.”216 This assertion, however, is of dubious validity, 
not only due to the existence of much foreign CISG case law,217 opinions worthy 
of a U.S. court’s cogitation,218 but also due to the fact that numerous domestic 
decisions have been issued in the last two decades.219 Nonetheless, many of these 
rulings are not published in the federal courts’ official reporters, rendering them 
bereft of conclusive and decisive precedential weight.220 Equally telling, less 
than a handful of bankruptcy opinions have extensively cited and rigorously 
applied CISG’s substantive provisions to a creditor’s claim.221 Indeed, one of 
the more famous bankruptcy-related cases, Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v. 
Marketing Australians Products Inc.,222 has elicited withering and justified 
criticism.223 
 
 215  But see Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
& POL’Y 217, 227–30 (2000) (collecting authorities).  
 216  Rienzi & Sons, Inc. v. N. Puglisi & F. Industria Paste Alimentari S.P.A., No. 08-CV-2540 (DLI) 
(JMA), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41478, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 
F. Supp. 2d 659, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 
(N.D. Ill. 2002).  
 217  Francesco G. Mazzotta, Why Do Some American Courts Fail to Get it Right?, 3 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. 
REV. 85, 95 (2005). 
 218  See supra Part IV.A. 
 219  Staff, supra note 203, at 14; McQuillen, supra note 204, at 511. 
 220  See Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who’s Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate Over the Precedential Value of 
Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860–77 (2002) (discussing the debate amongst the courts 
regarding the value of unpublished opinions). 
 221  E.g., In re World Imps., Ltd., 511 B.R. 738 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Siskiyou Evergreens, Inc., 
No. 02-66975-fra11, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1044 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2014). A few others engage in no substantial 
analysis. E.g., In re Access Cardiosystems, Inc., 361 B.R. 626, 641 n.19 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (quoting the 
relevant contact’s exclusionary clause); Ayers Aviation Holdings, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ga. (In re Ayers 
Aviation Holdings, Inc.), No. 00-11881, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1151, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 25, 2002) (noting 
that CISG’s second article excludes aircraft); Victoria Alloys, Inc. v. Fortis Bank SA/NV (In re Victoria Alloys, 
Inc.), 261 B.R. 424, 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (observing that both CISG and the UCC “require payment per 
the contract’s terms”).  
 222  See generally Helen Kaminski PTY Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Prods., No. M-47 (DLC), 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10630 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1997) (denying appellant’s motion for leave to appeal the bankruptcy 
court’s interlocutory order holding that CISG did not apply to a distributorship agreement). 
 223  Kilian, supra note 215, at 227 n.47; Victoria M. Genys, Note, Blazing a Trail in the “New Frontier” 
of the CISG: Helen Kaminski Pty. Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Products, Inc., 17 J. L. & COM. 415, 419 (1997). 
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C. Defining CISG’s Boundaries 
1. Jurisdictional Requirements 
CISG contains a “comprehensive set of rules governing the formation, 
performance, and remedies for breach of contracts within its jurisdictional 
scope.”224 It thus preempts contrary state laws only to the extent those statutory 
or common law rules impinge upon this specialized ambit: “the formation of the 
contract of sale and the right and obligations of the seller and buyer that arise 
from such a contract.”225 Once this jurisdictional standard is untangled into its 
components, the five legal elements that need to be established for CISG to 
govern a transaction can be succinctly stated: (1) the existence of “a contract for 
a sale;” (2) the sale concerns “goods;” (3) the parties’ “place[s] of business” or 
“habitual residence” are in different contracting states;226 (4) the plaintiff and 
defendant are the immediate buyer or the immediate seller;227 and (5) the parties 
have not expressly excluded CISG’s application in the relevant contract. Either 
explicitly stated or implicit in its text, these five elements are CISG’s threshold 
prerequisites. If even one is absent, CISG will not apply. Conversely, if all 
characterize the relevant transaction, CISG’s reach is absolute as a matter of 
valid and binding federal law,228 solicitude for any material differences from the 
UCC’s common variants of utmost significance,229 as the choice may often 
prove to be outcome determinative.230 
The first two of these essential prerequisites are relatively easy to ascertain. 
A “contract of sale” is defined in articles 30 through 52 as a contract pursuant to 
which one party (the seller) is bound to deliver the goods and transfers the 
property in the goods sold and the other party (the buyer) is obligated to pay the 
 
 224  Frisch, supra note 177, at 503; accord Grbic, supra note 179, at 175 (describing it as an “independent 
body of law”). 
 225  CISG arts. 1(1)(a), 4; accord, e.g., Usinor Industeel v. Leeco Steel Prods., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 
885 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Axiomatically, of course, contracts negotiated by an agent of the buyer or the seller would 
bind either party. See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189 (RCC), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5546, at *8–12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) (refusing to dismiss a complaint when complaint plausible 
alleged that the third party was but an agent). 
 226  CISG art. 1(1)(a). The third requirement is due to a reservation made by the United States, as permitted 
by article 95, prohibiting the application of section 1(b) of article 1 to sales between U.S. entities and business 
based in non-contracting states. 
 227  Martini E. Ricci Iamino S.P.A. v. Consortile Societa Agricola, No. 1:13-CF-276 AWI SAB, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 90604, at *35 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2014). 
 228  Chateau Des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
540 U.S. 1049 (2003). 
 229  Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 230  See, e.g., Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., 254 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 
2007); Frisch, supra note 177, at 505.  
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price and accept the goods.231 Unfortunately, CISG provides no concrete 
definition for the second, but its second article does explicitly exclude from its 
coverage the sales of six categories of “goods”: (a) “goods bought for personal, 
family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion 
of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were 
bought for any such use;” (b) “by auction;” (c) “on execution or otherwise by 
authority of law;” (d) “of stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable 
instruments or money;” (e) “of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft;” and (f) “of 
electricity.”232 These exclusions appear based on the purpose of the goods’ 
acquisition as ascertained at the time of purchase (article 2(a)), the type of sales 
contract involved (article 2(b) and (c)), or on the kind of goods sold (article 2(d), 
(e), (f)),233 CISG exempting goods bought for purely personal and non-
commercial use234 but covering contracts where seller is obliged to provide 
services and labor in addition to a commercial product235 or where goods are 
manufactured or produced by a seller without the buyer supplying “a substantial 
part of the materials necessary for such manufacture or production.”236 
CISG’s tenth article helps clarify the third prong. That article declares: 
“[T]he closest relationship theory” is to be employed in determining whether the 
parties “place[s] of business” is in a contracting state.237 As “a general rule,” the 
place of business is regarded as where “the center of the business activity 
directed to the participation is located.”238 As a textual matter, “[n]either the 
nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of the parties or 
of the contract” matters.239 Instead, a contract’s internationality depends upon 
the parties having their places of business (or habitual residences) in different 
 
 231  CISG arts. 30–52. 
 232  CISG art. 2(a)–(f); cf. Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 286 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (liming CISG’s scope); Frisch, supra note 177, at 504 (“[D]espite some similarities, the CISG 
does not necessarily resemble current article 2 [of the UCC] in either scope or substance.”). 
 233  Franco Ferrari, Specific Topics of the CISG in the Light of Judicial Application and Scholarly Writing, 
15 J.L. & COM. 1, 69, 73 (1995). 
 234  Michael Kabik, Through the Looking-Glass: International Trade in the “Wonderland” of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 408, 411 (1992). 
 235  Ferrari, supra note 233, at 61–62. The “preponderant part of the obligations” of the seller, however, 
cannot consist of “the supply of labor or other services.” CISG art. 3(2) (emphasis added). 
 236  CISG art. 3; Genphram Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 237  CISG art. 10(a)–(b); VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
 238  Ferrari, supra note 233, at 26–27. 
 239  CISG art. 1(3); Frank N. Fisanich, Note & Comment, Application of the U.N. Sales Convention in 
Chinese International Commercial Arbitration: Implications for International Uniformity, 10 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 101, 106 n.32 (1999). 
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contracting states,240 unless this fact would be impossible to discern from the 
contract itself or the parties’ prior dealings.241 
The fourth and fifth requirements have been consistently limned in case law. 
The fourth—that the parties be the transaction’s “immediate” participants, not 
“remote” purchasers or sellers—has been consistently imputed into CISG’s 
fourth article, which refers solely to buyers and sellers.242 As for the fifth, 
whereas, in accordance with article 6, CISG cannot apply if the parties expressly 
opted out of CISG,243 courts appear unwilling “to recognize implied agreements 
which exclude application of the convention.”244 Indeed, with one exception,245 
the understanding that contractual opt-outs must explicitly exclude CISG’s 
application to be effective is one of the few unmistakably endorsed by U.S. and 
foreign courts.246 
2. Explicit and Implicit Omissions from CISG’s Scope 
While CISG governs all issues dealing with the relevant contract’s formation 
and the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from the covered 
contract, the areas beyond its purview are equally apparent. Domestic law still 
dictates “the validity of the contract or of any of its provision or of any usage” 
and “the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods 
sold.”247 Accordingly, “those points of domestic law which express a country’s 
 
 240  Ferrari, supra note 233, at 23–24, 25. 
 241  CISG art. 1(2); Impuls I.D. Internacional, S.L. v. Psion-Teklogix Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1271 
(S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 242  CISG art. 4 (“This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and 
obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.” (emphasis added)); Beth Schiffer Fine 
Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. 10-05321, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, *19 (D.N.J. Mar. 
19, 2012) (collecting cases). Article 4 is nearly identical to article 1, the only difference being the addition of 
“only” in the former. Compare CISG art. 4, with CISG art. 1(1). 
 243  CISG art. 6. For examples of such clauses, see, e.g., Kofax, Inc. v. United States, No. 11-449 C, 2013 
U.S. Claims, LEXIS 1026, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Aug 8, 2013); Stella Maris, Inc. v. Cork Supply USA, Inc., No. 6:11-
cv-954-HO, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58497, at *7–8 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2012); Belcher-Robinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar 
Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Hawaiian Telcom Comm., Inc. v. Tata Am. Int’l Corp., 
No. 10-00112 HG-LEK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63187, at *3 (D. Haw. May 24, 2010); In re Yahoo! Inc., 313 
F. App’x 722, 722 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009); Jacada 
(Europe) Ltd. v Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 744, 746 (W.D. Mich. 2003). 
 244  Isaak I. Dore & James E. DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the 
UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 49, 53 (1982). 
 245  Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63–64 (D.R.I. 2006). Between 
2003 and 2008, every other American court disagreed with this one opinion. Staff, supra note 203, at 28. 
 246  McQuillen, supra note 204, at 519–20. 
 247  CISG art. 4; see also Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 276, 298–99 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that CISG “governs the substantive question of contract formation” and collecting 
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public policies”248—a class of doctrines clearly including fraud, mistake, duress, 
unconscionability, and illegality;249 possibly encompassing initial impossibility 
and apparent consent;250 and generally any provisions of domestic law that 
would “render the contract void, voidable, or unenforceable”—may work their 
influence untrammeled by CISG’s own.251 Logically, CISG will also not govern 
tort claims distinct from a party’s contractual action.252 Article 5, in turn, 
expressly removes actions and claims for personal injuries, including death, 
from CISG’s umbrella.253 Additionally, many “[c]ourts interpreting the CISG     
. . . have concluded that the law does not extend to agreements that create a 
framework for the future sale of goods but fail to establish specific terms for 
quantity and price.”254 This definition obviously excludes agreements, like 
distribution ones, that relate to the future sale of goods and not “a particular sale 
of goods” with “definite terms regarding quantity and price” enumerated.255 
3. General Principles and Trade Usages as Interpretive Aids 
Its reach so circumscribed, several of CISG’s provisions set forth the general 
precepts intended to shepherd interpretation of an ambiguous provision.256 In 
particular, during such a task, per article 7(1), “regard is to be had to its 
 
cases); Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 09-1424 LJO GSA, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11884, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan 22, 2010) (“CISG governs only the formation of the contract of sale, 
and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract.”); Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (quoting CISG). 
 248  Ulrich Drobnig, Substantive Validity, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 635, 635 (1992). 
 249  Hartnell, supra note 17, at 62, 69, 71, 83; Rosett, supra note 184, at 291. 
 250  Hartnell, supra note 17, at 62, 69, 71. 
 251  Tellingly, these doctrines are themselves “subject to multiple interpretations by domestic jurisdictions 
within the United States” and “lack of definite contours.” Lopez, supra note 205, at 14. 
 252  Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1024 (D. Minn. 
2010); accord, e.g., Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1790, at *8 n.2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011); Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., No. 99-6384, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12347, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000). Of course, as under domestic law, mere 
nomenclature may not be dispositive, and “a tort that is in essence a contract claim and does not involve interests 
existing independently of contractual obligations . . . will fall within the scope of CISG regardless of the label 
given to the claim.” Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120183, at *15–16 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); accord Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd. v. Level 
8 Apparel, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4405 (ALC)(FM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *47 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). 
 253  CISG art. 5; Peter Schlechtriem, Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the CISG, 
36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 781, 792 (2005). 
 254  Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
82217, at *10 (D. Md. July 27, 2011); accord Multi-Juice, S.A. v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4635 
(RPP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35928, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) (collecting sources). 
 255  Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., No. 99-6384, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12347, at *3–4, 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000) (emphasis added). 
 256  If the provision is not in any way ambiguous, it would be improper to consult these principles despite 
the apparently inclusive wording of article 7. See Part IV.A–B. 
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international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application 
and the observance of good faith in international trade.”257 Closely related,258 
these separable concerns—“international character,” “uniformity in 
application,” and “observance of good faith”—essentially authorize utilization 
of foreign case law259 and a court’s detachment from its own existing legal 
order.260 In essence, CISG’s plain text effectively compels resort to its own 
“general principles,”261 as does its use of “simple, non-nation specific 
language.”262 To interpret any CISG provision, a court must consider four 
factors: (1) CISG’s “international character;” (2) “the need to promote 
uniformity in its application” it embodies; (3) “the observance of good faith in 
international trade” it encourages; and (4) the provision of “some degree of 
certainty as to the principles of law that would govern potential disputes and 
[the] remov[al of] the previous doubt regarding which party’s legal system might 
otherwise apply” that it seeks to achieve263 by, among other features, its attempts 
to reduce forum shopping and private international law’s salience.264 
Promulgated in article 7(1), these principles cannot be marginalized.265 
 
 257  CISG art. 7(1); Genpharm Inc. v. Pliva-Lachema a.s., 361 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting 
CISG art. 7(1)). 
 258  Jenkins, supra note 200, at 187, 189. 
 259  See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 200, at 184; Camilla Baasch Andersen, The Uniform International Sales 
Law and the Global Jurisconsultorium, 24 J.L. & COM. 159, 165 (2005); James P. Quinn, The Interpretation 
and Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 INT’L 
TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 221, 237, 239 (2004); Alstine, supra note 158, at 732; Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1027. 
 260  Alstine, supra note 158, at 761; accord, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 200, at 185; Ferrari, supra note 233, 
at 10–11. 
 261  See Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (2d Cir. 1995); Topp Paper Co., LLC 
v. ETI Converting Equip., No. 12-21014-CIV-Rosenbaum/Seltzer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141193, at *7 (S.D. 
Fla. Sept. 28, 2013). 
 262  St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 9344 (SHS), 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).  
 263  CISG art. 7(1) (listing (1) through (3)); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (same); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1391 
(11th Cir. 1998) (enumerating (4), as stated in the President’s transmittal letter), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1087 
(1999). 
 264  Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010). Generally, “private 
international law” encompasses the area of jurisprudence that American courts “call ‘conflict of laws,’ dealing 
with the application of varying domestic laws to disputes that have an interstate or international component.” 
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 227 (1996). 
 265  Bruno Zeller, The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) – A Leap 
Forward Towards Unified International Sales Laws, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 79, 86, 105 (2000); Ferrari, supra 
note 197, at 1023–24, 1026. 
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Nevertheless, pursuant to article 7(2), implicitly triggered only if both the 
plain text and article 7(1) do not divulge a single concrete answer,266 questions 
concerning matters “not expressly settled in” yet still “governed” by CISG “are 
to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in 
the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue 
of the rules of private international law.”267 Two problems immediately arise 
from this command: first, the phrase “general principles” has been criticized as 
inherently and impossibly vague,268 and second, CISG does not actually specify 
a single “general principle[].”269  
Despite this overwhelming paucity, based on the widely invoked model laws 
and commentary published by the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (“UNIDROIT”),270 the following “general principles” have earned 
this vital classification: (1) both buyer and seller have an affirmative duty to 
disclose material facts and communicate all material information;271 (2) 
relatedly, a party may not contradict a statement on which the other party 
relied;272 (3) subject to article 4’s validity exception,273 autonomous parties may 
freely contract to whatever duties and obligations they believe necessary or 
appropriate,274 and courts are bound to respect those clearly expressed 
intentions;275 (4) courts should strive to preserve an apparent deal and ensure 
each party receives the reasonably projected fruits of an open exchange;276 (5) 
technicalities and formal requirements should not be enforced for their own 
sake;277 (6) a non-breaching party should take reasonable efforts to mitigate any 
damages278 and should cooperate with the other to fix any curable defect prior 
 
 266  See Alstine, supra note 158, at 729, 742. Others have more expansively contended: “CISG mandates 
the use of general principles, both express and implied, found within its Articles.” DiMatteo et al., supra note 
201, at 315. 
 267  CISG art. 7(2); Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
id.). 
 268  Ferrari, supra note 196, at 211. 
 269  Alstine, supra note 158, at 959; see also Bailey, supra note 179, at 287. 
 270  Indeed, while CISG commentators have bemoaned about the absence of something akin to a 
restatement, Hartwig, supra note 178, at 97, the UNIDROIT principles have been described as an international 
restatement of contract law, see Joseph Lookofsky, The Limits of Commercial Contract Freedom: Under the 
UNIDROIT ‘Restatement’ and Danish Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 48, 485–88 (1998). 
 271  Alstine, supra note 158, at 752; Rosett, supra note 184, at 290; Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 
63. 
 272  Salama, supra note 190, at 241; Alstine, supra note 158, at 752. 
 273  See supra Part IV.C.2.  
 274  Blair, supra note 175, at 286. 
 275  Quinn, supra note 259, at 229, 231. 
 276  Id. at 229; Harjani, supra note 184, at 64. 
 277  Sheaffer, supra note 175, at 473. 
 278  Alstine, supra note 158, at 752. 
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to a deadline’s expiration or the good’s irreparable dilapidation;279 (7) if a truly 
unforeseen impediments arose, reasonable contractual modifications ought to be 
considered, even if not accepted;280 (8) full compensation should be ordered in 
the event of a breach,281 but awards should be directed at “compensate[ing] 
aggrieved parties” rather than “punish[ing] breaching parties”;282 and (9) unless 
a party’s subjective state of mind has been made known to the other party, its 
responsibilities under the contract must be determined in accordance with a 
reasonable person standard,283 a term that itself appears more than thirty times 
in the entire convention.284 Finally, although “CISG does not recognize as a 
general obligation of the parties an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
in the performance and enforcement of contracts,”285 the possible inclusion of 
such a standard invoking much disagreement during its drafting,286 the weight 
of precedent has endorsed a tenth general tenet: (10) a duty of good faith,287 one 
analogous to the UCC’s variant.288 Serving to reinforce CISG’s express 
provisions, this good faith principle has been employed to punish “fraudulent 
conduct, unfair conduct, and deliberate conduct contrary to the essential 
purposes or terms of the agreement.”289  
A source of guidance distinct from the foregoing is lodged in CISG’s ninth 
article. Having induced much debate among CISG’s drafters,290 article 9 
selectively incorporates internationally known and observed trade usages. Thus, 
per article 9(1), “parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and 
 
 279  Rosett, supra note 184, at 290. 
 280  Id. at 290. 
 281  Alstine, supra note 158, at 752. 
 282  Quinn, supra note 259, at 229. 
 283  Alstine, supra note 158, at 751–52; Ferrari, supra note 196, at 225. Like its domestic counterpart, this 
standard has been critiqued for being “defined differently by courts” and “particularly vague,” Sheaffer, supra 
note 175, at 473 n.75. 
 284  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 317. 
 285  Jenkins, supra note 200, at 193. 
 286  Rosett, supra note 184, at 289. 
 287  See, e.g., DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 319 (“Despite the confinement of the express duty of good 
faith to CISG interpretation, courts and arbitral panels have implied a general duty of good faith to dealings 
between contracting parties.”); Alstine, supra note 158, at 780–81 (“Scholarly analysis subsequent to the 
adoption of the Convention, however, has led to an emerging consensus on a much more expansive role for good 
faith. Whatever the drafters’ actual intent, this new consensus recognizes ‘good faith’ as one of the ‘general 
principles’ of the Convention.”); Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 61 (“Thus, the good faith provision in 
the Convention appears to be a pervasive norm analogous to the good faith obligation of the U.C.C.”). 
 288  Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 61. 
 289  Jenkins, supra note 200, at 193–94; see also Zeller, supra note 265, at 101 (“Good faith . . . covers . . . 
the parties’ rights and obligations. Basically, it is a ‘general duty’ based on judicial interpretation of community 
standards, reasonableness and fair play.”). 
 290  Leonardo Graffi, Remarks on Trade Usages and Business Practices in International Sales Law, 29 J.L. 
& COM. 273, 275 (2011). 
SHACHMUROVE GALLEYPROOFS 6/14/2018 3:41 PM 
500 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 34 
by any practices which they have established between themselves,”291 and such 
usages, subjectively understood, can “bind the parties either through express or 
implied agreement,”292 with the party relying upon a particular usage bearing the 
burden to prove its existence.293 If, however, the parties did not share a provable 
subjective understanding, article 9(2) intones, “[t]he parties are considered . . . 
to have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of 
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international trade 
is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type 
involved in the particular trade concerned.”294 Because, based on this text, trade 
usages must be both widely observed and widely known for them to bind parties 
under article 9(2), so-called “incoterms,” a series of pre-defined commercial 
terms published by the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), have 
become usages within the meaning of this second paragraph,295 a position 
affirmed by several U.S. courts.296 Still, in accordance with article 9(1), when 
comparing express contractual terms, a verifiable course of performance or 
dealing normally trumps even such objectively demonstrable trade usages.297 
IV. UNIFIED APPROACH: THE CODE AND THE CISG 
Perhaps unsurprisingly,298 CISG and the UCC encode a number of similar 
legal principles,299 leading more than one court to (too hastily) describe the 
former as “an international analogue” to the latter’s second article.300 True, both 
 
 291  CISG art. 9(1); Riccitelli v. Elemar New Eng. Marble & Granite LLC, No. 3:08CV01783(DJS), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086, at *13 (D. Conn. Sept. 11, 2010). 
 292  Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 57. 
 293  Graffi, supra note 290, at 281. 
 294  CISG art. 9(2); Kabik, supra note 234, at 417–18 (discussing article 9(2)). 
 295  E.g., Graffi, supra note 290, at 283–84; Staff, supra note 177, at 31–32; Ingeborg Schwenzer, The 
Danger of Domestic Pre-Conceived Views with Respect to the Uniform Interpretation of the CISG: The Question 
of Avoidance in the Case of Non-Conforming Goods and Documents, 36 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 
795, 804 (2005). 
 296  BP Oil Int’l Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (PetroExuador), 332 F.3d 333, 335, 337–38 
(5th Cir. 2003); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys. Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9344 (SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5096, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); see also, e.g., Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 11-
02476 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110015, at *10 n.50 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (citing BP Oil Int’l 
Ltd., 332 F.3d at 335, and St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., ), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *9–11). 
 297  Dore & DeFranco, supra note 244, at 59. 
 298  See Magellan Int’l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 924 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(describing the pleading requirements set forth in CISG and the UCC as what “common sense” would dictate as 
a minimum in their absence). 
 299  E.g., Simar Shipping Ltd. v. Global Fishing, Inc., 540 F. App’x 565, 567 (9th Cir. 2013); Dingxi 
Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1108 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 300  Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd., 635 F.3d at 1107; accord, e.g., Sierra Seed Internacional SA de CV v. Al 
Harrison Co. Distribs., No. CIV 13-206 TUC LAB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92777, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 10, 
2013); Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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CISG and the common law consider “a meeting of the minds on essential terms” 
as the linchpin for “[a] valid contract,”301 and both demand the same elements 
for a breach of contract action to be properly pled and later proved: formation, 
performance, breach, and damages.302 Indeed, the common law and common 
sense compel as much.303 For such reasons, in many cases, the relevant 
provisions of CISG and the UCC will produce the same legal consequences in a 
particular case.304 Yet, regardless of the courts’ frequent refrain,305 CISG’s 
design and provisions, scholars have long observed, are predisposed towards a 
contract’s establishment and damages’ assessment in the interest of facilitating 
international trade. In essence, this penchant aligns with the logic presumed to 
animate international commercial treaties. As the Court once incisively observed 
regarding the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards,306 “concerns of international comity . . . and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution 
of disputes”307 may require enforcement of a parties’ accord without regard to 
domestic law’s necessarily more “parochial concept[s].”308  
In short, despite these the structural congruencies between these two distinct 
bodies of contract law, as to the three traditional elements necessary to prevail 
 
 301  Simar Shipping Ltd., 540 F. App’x at 567 (alteration in original) (quoting with approval Simar Shipping 
Ltd. v. Global Fishing, Inc., No. C09-1825-JCC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67076, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 14, 
2012)); compare CISG art. 14(1), with Merrin-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Gunderson Bros Eng’g Corp., 305 
F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1962). 
 302  Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd., 635 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Magellan Int’l Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 924) 
accord, e.g., Martini E Ricci Iamino S.P.A. – Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fuirt Sales Co., 30 F. Supp. 
3d 954, 965 (E.D, Cal. 2014) (citing Dingxi Longhai Dairy, 635 F.3d at 1107; Chi. Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d 
at 898; and Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex, 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 303  Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd., 635 F.3d at 1108. 
 304  Chi. Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898, cited in VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 
748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2014); accord, e.g., Martini E. Ricci Camino S.P.A. – Consortile Societa Agricola 
v. Trinity Fruit Sales Co., No. 1:13-CV-276 AWI SAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90604, at *17 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 
2014); Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 305  See, e.g., Hilaturas Miel, S.L., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 800; Chi. Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898; Delchi 
Carrier SpA, 71 F.3d at 1028.  
 306  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
 307  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985); see also Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (characterizing a forum-selection clause as “an almost 
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international 
business transaction”).  
 308  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); see also, e.g., Estate of Myhra v. Royal 
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2012). “We cannot,” Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
wrote in 1972, “have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, 
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.” The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; see also Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) 
Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting The Bremen after describing it as “not strictly an arbitration 
case”).  
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on a breach of contract claim—(1) “the existence of an enforceable contract;” 
(2) “nonperformance amounting to a breach of contract;” and (3) “damage 
caused by the breach of contract”309—CISG and the UCC delineate these 
elements rather differently.310 Accordingly, assuming the jurisdictional 
constraints set forth in articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 have been met and that no intent 
to derogate from CISG sufficiently unequivocal to trigger article 6 can be 
established, CISG will always impel a unique approach and, sometimes, an 
unfamiliar result.  
A. Existence of an Enforceable Contract  
1. Summary of Relevant Articles 
Under CISG (and the UCC, for that matter), the existence of an offer and the 
communication of a valid acceptance are threshold elements for a contract to be 
engendered.311 For a statement, whether written or oral, to constitute an offer, 
the offeror must express an intention to be bound, and the proposal itself must 
be definite by “indicat[ing] the goods and expressly or implicitly fix[ing] or 
mak[ing] provision for determining the quantity and the price.”312 In contrast to 
the UCC, article 15(1) contains a receipt, not a mailbox, rule: an offer becomes 
effective when it “reaches,” as defined in article 24,313 the offeree.314 However, 
“[a]n offer, even if it is irrevocable, may be withdrawn if the withdrawal reaches 
the offeree before or at the same time as the offer.”315 In fact, “[u]ntil a contract 
is concluded an offer may be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before 
 
 309  Smith v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LLP, 552 F. App’x 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (enumerating the 
elements required under Tennessee law). 
 310  Of course, in some situations, outcomes may still be identical. See, e.g., New World Trading Co. v. 2 
Feet Prods., No. 11 civ. 6219 (SAS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17599, at *4 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2014). Some 
courts, however, seem willing to posit a seamless identity and to overlook, via a self-evident assumption, the 
significance of a possible divergence. See Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption 
for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 29, 47–48 (2007).  
 311  CISG art. 23; Orica Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJM-CBS, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98248, at *15 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015). 
 312  CISG art. 14(1); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschift mbH, No. 3:CV-11-2379, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 897, at *37–38 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2015); Joseph M. Perillo, Essay, UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 320 (1994). 
 313  CISG art. 24; Charles H. Martin, The Electronic Contracts Convention, the CISG, and New Sources of 
E-Commerce Law, 16 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 481 (2008). 
 314  CISG art. 15(1); cf. Feng Chen, The New Era of Chinese Contract Law: History, Development and a 
Comparative Analysis, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 153, 173–74 (2001) (comparing Chinese contract law with 
CISG). 
 315  CISG art. 15(2); Franco Ferrari, Formation of Contracts in South American Legal Systems, 16 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 629, 642 n.102 (1994). 
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he has dispatched an acceptance,” unless the offer declares its irrevocability or 
the offeree relied upon the offer’s apparent irrevocability.316 Even if irrevocable, 
an offeree’s rejection will terminate an offer whenever that rejection reaches the 
offeror.317 Critically, “[a] statement made by or other conduct of the offeree 
indicating assent to an offer is an acceptance;” nonetheless, “[s]ilence or 
inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.”318  
Whatever its form, an acceptance is effective at the moment the offeree’s 
“indication of assent” reaches the offeror, but not if that indication does not 
arrive within the time fixed by the offeror, as defined in article 20,319 or within 
“a reasonable time.”320 Oral offers must be accepted “immediately unless the 
circumstances indicate otherwise,”321 and provision is made for late 
acceptances.322 In another pivotal difference with the UCC, CISG’s nineteenth 
article adopts the “now discarded common law mirror rule with the exception 
that minor differences do not defeat an otherwise valid acceptance.”323 Thus, if 
an additional term contains even minimal “additions, limitations or other 
modifications,” it amounts to a rejection and a counter-offer.324 But, unless those 
additional terms are “material,” broadly defined as “relating, among other 
things, to the price, payment, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time 
of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the settlement of 
disputes,”325 the original offeror’s failure to timely objects will be construed as 
 
 316  CISG art. 16(1)–(2). This importation of the UCC’s presumption of revocability into CISG’s sixteenth 
article was a concession by civil law countries, one foreign to the civil law. See Courtney Parrish Smart, 
Formation of Contracts in Louisiana under the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 
53 LA. L. REV. 1339, 1349–50 (1993) (explaining how CISG differed from Louisiana’s civil law system). 
Notably, CISG still allows an offer to be irrevocable in only two instances. CISG art. 16(2)(a)–(b). 
 317  CISG art. 17; see also DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 335–36 (“Article 17 may be linked to Article 
19 when the rejection is ambiguous, since it may be interpreted as a counteroffer (rejection) or as an 
acceptance.”). 
 318  CISG art. 18(1); Solae, LLC v. Hershey Can., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457 (D. Del. 2008). 
 319  CISG art. 20(1)–(2); Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contract Resurrected! Contract Formation: Common Law 
~ UCC ~ CISG, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 245, 271–72 (2015). 
 320  CISG art. 18(2); Orica Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJM-
CBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98248, at *10–11 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Anjanette H. Raymond, Manner, 
Method, Receipt or Dispatch: The Use of Electronic Media is Nothing New to the Law, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1, 17 
n.72 (2006). 
 321  CISG art. 18(2); Easom Automation Sys., Inc. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., No. 06-14553, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 72461, at *9–10 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2007). 
 322  CISG art. 21(1)–(2). 
 323  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 349. 
 324  CISG art. 19(1); CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (D. 
Md. 2011). 
 325  CISG art. 19(3); VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(contending that article 19(3) defines “‘materiality’ in a broad way that would appear to cover attorney’s fees 
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an acceptance of “the offer with the modification contained in the 
acceptance.”326 Once concluded, a contract can be modified by the parties’ mere 
agreement unless the contract itself requires a written one.327 In other words, 
“oral termination or modifications . . . are ineffective if the parties have 
previously prescribed formalities to such acts.”328  
Where CISG applies, several defenses that may be raised to a contract’s 
enforcement, reflecting “certain familiarities”329 embedded in Anglo-American 
contract law and otherwise available to offended buyers under the UCC and 
relevant for a claim’s disallowance per § 502(b)(1) and a debt’s dischargeability 
under § 523(a)(2), have no legal force.  
First, as CISG contains no statute of frauds, it does not require contracts for 
sale to be concluded in writing; a contract may be “proved by any means, 
including witnesses.”330 Relatedly, binding modifications need not be reduced 
to writing.331 Second, the parol evidence rule has no place in interpretation.332 
Instead, per article 8(1), “statements made by and other conduct of a party are to 
be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not 
have been unaware what that intent was.”333 And while a reasonable person 
standard applies when no such knowledge exists,334 article 8(3) vastly expands 
the scope of the inquiry normally permitted: “In determining the intent of a party 
 
and interest provisions”); 2P Commercial Agency S.R.O. v. SRT USA, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-652-FtM-29SPC, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9186, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2013) (quoting article 19(3)). 
 326  CISG art. 19(2); see, e.g., Belcher-Robinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337 
(M.D. Ala. 2010); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 431–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); DiMatteo et al., supra 
note 201, at 355. 
 327  CISG art. 29; Kabik, supra note 234, at 420. 
 328  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 331. 
 329  Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 330  CISG art. 11; see also, e.g., Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Miami Valley Paper LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
25201, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009). 
 331  CISG art. 29; see also, e.g., Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 242 F. App’x 840, 845 (3d Cir. 2007); Chateau Des Charmes Wines 
LTD. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2003). The term “writing” includes telegram and telex. 
CISG art. 13.  
 332  CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (D. Md. 2011); 
accord, e.g., Weihai Textile Grp. Import & Export Co., Ltd. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4405 
(ALC)(FM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). Per article 12, however, a 
nation-state can make a declaration under article 96 to exempt itself from this embracing this informal system. 
CISG art. 12. 
 333  CISG art. 8(1); MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 
1387 n.7 (11th Cir. 1998).  
 334  CISG art. 8(2); Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. Karl Wetekam & Co. KG, 26 F. Supp. 3d 496, 503–04 
(M.D.N.C. 2014). 
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or the understanding a reasonable person would have had, due consideration is 
to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, 
any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and 
any subsequent conduct of the parties.”335 Due to these related tenets, “[c]ontrary 
to what is familiar practice in United States courts,” CISG permits “a substantial 
inquiry into the parties’ subjective intent, even if the parties did not engage in 
any objectively ascertainable means of registering this intent.”336 With CISG 
rejecting the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule,337 neither a debtor 
nor a creditor will be able to negate a contract simply due to the absence of an 
objective text. One exception does exist: an express merger clause, permissible 
under article 29, may foreclose use of extrinsic evidence in the same manner as 
allowed under the UCC.338 
2. Code Application of CISG’s Oddities 
Based on the foregoing, the following intelligence can be drawn. So as to 
ascertain whether a Code cognizable “claim,” as defined in § 101, could exist 
for purposes of §§ 501, 502, and 523 and Rule 3018(a),339 a court must disregard 
the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule and apply the receipt and the 
mirror image doctrines.340 In the process of disregarding the former duo and 
utilizing the latter twosome, the court must be prepared to make a “substantial 
inquiry into the parties’ subjective intent, even if the parties did not engage in 
any objectively ascertainable means of registering this intent,” in deciding 
whether an enforceable contract had ever effectively been struck.341 
Concurrently, the court must interpret even ambiguous contractual provisions in 
light of CISG’s ascertainable general principles and verifiable trade usage.342 
 
 335  CISG art. 8(3); Tuftworthy LLC, 26 F. Supp. at 504; ECEM European Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite 
Co., No. 05-3078, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7373, at *30–31 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010). 
 336  MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th 
Cir. 1998); see also Fercus, S.R.L. v. Palazzo, No. 98 CIV. 7728 (NRB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11086, at *7–
8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2000) (applying the U.C.C.).  
 337  Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also, e.g., 
Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB) (THK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4586, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 7, 1998). 
 338  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 333 (citing MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc., 144 F.3d at 1391). But 
see CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 3 (“The effect [of a merger clause] may be to prevent a party from 
relying on evidence of statements or agreements not contained in the writing . . . [and] may bar evidence of trade 
usages. However, in determining the effect of such a Merger Clause, the parties’ statements and negotiations, as 
well as all other relevant circumstances shall be taken into account.”).  
 339  See supra Part III.B–D. 
 340  See supra Part V.A.1.  
 341  MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., 144 F.3d at 1387.  
 342  See supra Part IV.C.3.  
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Effectively, so as to do so in the most reasonable and predictable fashion, 
thereby honoring international trade’s need for uniform and predictable rules, 
UNIDROIT’s nine precepts and ICC’s Incoterms must be utilized to demarcate 
undefined terms and fill unexpected gaps.343 Though debate continues, 
consistent with modern interpretive constraints,344 the good-faith principle 
implicit in every contract345 and sanctioned by the UCC has no place where 
CISG reigns.346  
B. Duties and Breach Defined  
1. Summary of Relevant Articles 
Under CISG, the seller,347 whether or not that entity was the original offeror 
or offeree, must comply with a series of express commands to avoid committing 
a breach, however material or fundamental it may later be proven to be. A seller 
“must deliver the goods, hand over any documents relating to them[,] and 
transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this 
Convention.”348 If the contract itself does not specify a “particular place” for the 
goods’ delivery, a seller satisfies his, her, or its delivery obligation in one of 
three ways: (1) “if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods, in handing 
the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer”; (2) in other 
cases, if the contract “relates to specific goods[] or [to] unidentified goods to be 
drawn from a specific stock or to be manufactured or produced, and at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract the parties knew that the goods were at, or were 
to be manufactured or produced at, a particular place—in placing the goods at 
the buyer’s disposal at that place”; or (3) in all other cases, “in placing the goods 
 
 343  See supra Part IV.C.3. 
 344  See supra Part IV. 
 345  Cf. Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 46, at 564–65 (summarizing the “ancient” obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing). 
 346  See, e.g., DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 319 (discussing the reliance and uncertain foundation for 
this principle); Richard E. Spiedel, The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165, 177 (1995) (“CISG 
imposes no explicit duty of good faith in the performance or enforcement of the contract for sale[,]” yet “‘good 
faith and fair dealing’ is a fundamental idea underlying the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts as well.”). 
 347  Once a contract has been concluded, the terms “offeree” and “offerror” are no longer apposite. Instead, 
CISG divided responsibilities between the goods’ seller (or the deliverer) and the buyer or purchaser of the 
designated goods (or the recipient). 
 348  CISG art. 30; Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 11-02476 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110015, at *45–46 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014); Douglas A. Hass, A Gentleman’s Agreement Assessing the 
Gnu General Public License and Its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. L. 213, 224 n.100 (2007). 
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at the buyer’s disposal at the place where the seller had his place of business at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract.”349  
Under article 32, if the seller employs a carrier and the goods are not “clearly 
identified to the contract” by their own markings, “the seller must give the buyer 
notice of the consignment specifying the goods.”350 Logically, “[i]f the seller is 
bound to arrange for carriage of the goods, he must make such contracts as are 
necessary for carriage to the place fixed by means of transportation appropriate 
in the circumstances and according to the usual terms for such transportation.”351 
Governed by article 34, delivery of critical documents is subject to a similar 
structure.352 Article 33 sets forth the rules for ascertaining the proper time for 
delivery. “[I]f a date is fixed by or determinable from the contract,” the seller 
must deliver the goods on that date or “at any time within that period unless 
circumstances indicate that the buyer is to choose a date.”353 “[I]n any other 
case,” the seller must do so “within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the 
contract.”354 Like other CISG provisions littered with the ambiguous 
“reasonable,” articles 31, 32, and 34 are interpreted pursuant to article 9.355 To 
wit, use of trade terms and consideration of the parties’ courses of dealing and 
performance will determine the propriety of the location and means of 
transportation ultimately chosen.356 
Assuming a seller has timely delivered the goods, one more hurdle must be 
cleared. As article 35(1) makes clear, “[t]he seller must deliver goods which are 
of the quantity, quality and description required by the contract and which are 
 
 349  CISG art. 31 (emphasis added); Ronald A. Brand, CISG Article 31: When Substantive Law Rules Affect 
Jurisdictional Results, 25 J. L. & COM. 181, 182 & n.1 (2005) (“CISG Article 31 sets up four rules for 
determining the place of performance of the seller’s obligation to deliver goods: a party autonomy rule followed 
by three default rules.”). 
 350  CISG art. 32(1); Martini R Ricci Iamino S.P.A. – Consortile Societa Agricola v. Trinity Fruit Sales 
Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 954, 969 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
 351  CISG art. 32(2); Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72898, at 
*21–22 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013); DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 385–86. 
 352  CISG art. 34; John C. Duncan, Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist? Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: 
Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU. L. REV. 1363, 1380 (2000); Henry D. Gabriel, A Primer 
on the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods: From the Perspective of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 7 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 294 (1997). 
 353  CISG art. 33(a)–(b); New World Trading Co. v. 2 Feet Prods., Nos. 11 Civ. 6219 (SAS), 13 Civ. 1251 
(SAS), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68304, at *23 & n.124 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2014) (citing art. 33(a)). 
 354  CISG art. 33(c); Alpha Prime Dev. Corp. v. Holland Loader Co., No. 09-cv-01763-WYD-KMT, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67591, at *18 (D. Colo. July 6, 2010); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Power Source Supply, Inc., No. 06-
58 J, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56942, at *9–10 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008).  
 355  See supra Part IV.C. 
 356  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 385, 389.  
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contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract.”357 Unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise, the delivered goods will be deemed 
nonconforming, the seller in breach, in four cases: (1) they are not “fit for the 
purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be used”; (2) 
they are not “fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known 
to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract”; (3) they do not 
“possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a 
sample or model”; or (4) they are not “contained or packaged in the manner 
usual for such goods or, where there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to 
preserve and protect the goods.”358  
A seller remains liable for any lack of conformity which exists “at the time 
when the risk passes to the buyer, even though the lack of conformity becomes 
apparent only after that time”359 and even afterward if this dearth was “due to a 
breach of any of . . . [the seller’s] obligations.”360 In these situations, article 35 
itself provides a seller with two safe harbors of varying effectiveness. First, the 
seller may still correct any nonconformity if the offending goods were delivered 
before the set “date for delivery,” assuming “the exercise of this right does not 
cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense;” the 
seller will nonetheless remain liable for any damages traceable to the original 
nonconformity.361 Second, the seller will avoid any liability under article 35 “if 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer knew or could not have 
been unaware of such lack of conformity.”362 So structured, article 35(2) appears 
to incorporate the implied warranties for a particular purpose.363 In contrast with 
the UCC, these warranties may be disclaimed so long as the parties have agreed 
 
 357  CISG art. 35(1); St. Tropez Inc. v. Ningbo Maywood Indus. & Trade Co., No. 13 Civ. 5230 (NRB), 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96840, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014). 
 358  CISG art. 35(2)(a)–(d); Miami Valley Paper LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-
CV-00702, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25201, at *28 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (incorrectly citing to article 35(3)). 
 359  CISG art. 36(1); Orica Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJM-
CBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98248, at *20 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Alpha Prime Dev. Corp. v. Holland Loader 
Co., No. 09-cv-01763-WYD-KMT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67591, at *15 (D. Colo. July 6, 2010); Chi. Prime 
Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 360  CISG art. 36(2) (emphasis added); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189 
(RCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *44 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006).  
 361  CISG art. 37; David G. Fagan, The Remedial Provisions of the Vienna Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods 1980: A Small Business Perspective, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 317, 344 n.177 (1998). 
 362  CISG art. 35(3); In re Siskiyou Evergreens, Inc., No. 02-66975-fra11, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1044, at *7 
(Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 29, 2004). 
 363  Kabik, supra note 234, at 420. 
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to do orally or in writing or the buyer knew or could not have been unaware of 
the nonconformity.364 
The buyer, naturally enough, must adhere to separate set of often reciprocal 
obligations.365 Generally, “[t]he buyer must pay the price for the goods and take 
delivery of them as required by the contract and this Convention,”366 including 
taking “taking such steps and complying with such formalities as may be 
required under the contract or any laws and regulations to enable payment to be 
made.”367 Article 57 governs the buyer’s obligation to remit payment;368 article 
58 is applicable when the contract establishes no specific time for payment; 369 
and article 59 makes clear the buyer’s obligation to “pay the price on the date 
fixed by or determinable from the contract and this Convention without the need 
for any request or compliance with any formality on the part of the seller.”370 
The buyer must also take delivery, which consists of two distinct tasks: (1) 
“doing all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him in order to enable 
the seller to make delivery,” and (2) “taking over the goods.”371  
Moreover, “[l]oss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the 
buyer does not discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss 
or damage is due to an act or omission of the seller.”372 Per article 67(1), “[i]f 
 
 364  Compare CISG art. 35(3), with U.C.C. § 2-316 (“[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of 
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and 
conspicuous.”). 
 365  See Tacy Katherine Hass, New Governance: Can User-Promulgated Certification Schemes Provide 
Safer, Higher Quality Food?, 68 FOOD DRUG L.J. 77, 91 (2013) (noting that “the buyer’s main duty under the 
CISG” is “to pay for the goods he has purchased, elaborated in Articles 53 and 54”).  
 366  CISG art. 53; Victoria Alloys, Inc. v. Fortis Bank SA/NV (In re Victoria Alloys, Inc.), 261 B.R. 424, 
431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 367  CISG art. 54; Hilaturas Miel S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); 
Alejandro Osuna-Gonzalez, Buyer’s Enabling Steps to Pay the Price: Article 54 of the United Nation’s 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 25 J. L. & COM. 299, 302–07 (2005) (dissecting 
article).  
 368  CISG art. 57; Franco Ferrari, PIL and CISG: Friends or Foes?, 31 J. L. & COM. 45, 89 n.219 (2013). 
For clarity’s sake, “PIL” refers to private international law. 
 369  CISG art. 58; Urica, Inc. v. Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 11-02476 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110015, at *48 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 370  CISG art. 59; Le Pupille v. Nickolas Imps., No. 1:12-cv-668-TRJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188823, 
at*3–4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2013). 
 371  CISG art. 60(a)–(b); Henry D. Gabriel, The Buyer’s Performance under the CISG: Articles 53-60, 25 
J. L. & COM. 273, 282 (2005) (“Article 60 43 articulates the requirements of the second of the buyer’s primary 
responsibilities under Article 53”: to “take delivery of the goods.”). 
 372  CISG art. 66; Donald L. Grace, Comment, Force Majeure, China & the CISG: Is China’s New Contract 
Law a Step in the Right Direction?, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 173, 192 (2001) (“The theory of passage of risk,” 
as embodied in article 66, “is consistent with the contractual norm of leaving the parties at status quo when a 
contract becomes terminated due to a force majeure event.”). 
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the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods and the seller is not bound to 
hand them over at a particular place, the risk passes to the buyer when the goods 
are handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in accordance 
with the contract of sale.”373 In fact, “[t]he risk in respect of goods sold in transit 
passes to the buyer from the time of the conclusion of the contract,” unless “the 
seller knew or ought to have known that the goods had been lost or damaged and 
did not disclose this to the buyer” at the time of the contract’s conclusion.374 
However, this risk will not pass unless and until “the goods are clearly identified 
to the contract, whether by markings on the goods, by shipping documents, by 
notice given to the buyer or otherwise.”375 By virtue of these interlocking 
articles, the risk of loss passes under CISG without regard to the goods’ actual 
owner.376 
Closely linked to the deliverer’s obligations under article 35, a buyer has a 
duty to inspect the delivered goods and provide the seller with any notice of 
nonconformity under CISG. To satisfy article 38, this examination must occur 
“within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances,”377 though it may 
be deferred in two expressly identified situations,378 and be “reasonable.”379 The 
first requirement—“as is practicable”—has been strictly construed as 
necessitating great promptness;380 based on these and similar cases, scholars 
have concluded that inspection may be deferred under article 38(1) only when 
“the buyer is a mere intermediary or when the goods are delivered directly to 
end users” or can show “the absence of a real opportunity to examine all of the 
goods.”381 Imported into CISG, the second—that the inspection must be 
“reasonable”— depends on “the provisions of the contract in question, usage of 
 
 373  CISG art. 67(1); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, No. 00 Civ. 9344 
(SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). 
 374  CISG art. 68; Sandeep Gopalan, Transnational Commercial Law: The Way Forward, 18 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 803, 807 n.12 (2003). 
 375  CISG art. 67(2); Jan Ramberg, To What Extent Do Incoterms 2000 Vary Articles 67(2), 68 and 69?, 25 
J. L. & COM. 219, 220 (2006). 
 376  St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5096, at *13. 
 377  CISG art. 38(1); Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85610, at *17 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 19, 2010). 
 378  CISG art. 38(2)–(3); Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB), 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014) (citing article 28(2)); Chi. Prime Packers, Inc. 
v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing article 38(2) and (3)). 
 379  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 362. 
 380  Shuttle Packaging Sys. LLC v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *26 
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001) (“[T]he wording of CISG reveals an intent that buyers examine the goods promptly 
and give notice of defects to sellers promptly.” (then setting up a deadline of two years for barring late notices)); 
accord Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85610, at *20 (citing Chi. Prime Packers, Inc, 320 F. 
Supp. 2d at 711–12). 
 381  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 362. 
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the trade, the type of goods, and the technical facilities and expertise of the 
parties.”382 Despite this necessarily flexible standard, the buyer will be held 
responsible for the failure to discover “nonconformity readily apparent from” a 
reasonable inspection and will only be excused from a “complete examination” 
if the “quantity or nature of the products renders comprehensive inspection 
unreasonable.”383 Under article 39, after such an inspection, a buyer must give 
specific notice of the goods’ partial or complete nonconformity within a 
“reasonable time,” a standard more strictly construed under CISG than the UCC, 
or, at most, within two years from the goods’ delivery.384  
Like the seller, the buyer has two weapons at his, her, or its disposal even if 
the notice sent was either untimely or too general. First, this failure will be 
deemed immaterial “if the lack of conformity relates to facts of which he knew 
or could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer.”385 
Second, regardless of article 39, “the buyer may reduce the price in accordance 
with article 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a reasonable 
excuse for his failure to give the required notice.”386 
Both deliverers and recipients may make use of article 79 and bear a duty to 
preserve any goods ordered or received. Article 79 excuses nonperformance 
upon a three-part showing: (1) “the failure [to perform] was due to an 
impediment beyond . . . [the breaching party’s] control”; (2) that party “could 
not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract”; and (3) that same party could not have 
reasonably “avoided or overcome” this impediment “or its consequences.”387  
Distinct from the common law’s impossibility standard and the UCC’s own 
impracticability variant,388 a distinction famously missed by one court,389 this 
test focuses on the causal link between the asserted impediment and the 
 
 382  Id. 
 383  Id. at 363. 
 384  CISG art. 39(1)–(2); Ferrari, supra note 233, at 111. If a delivery is only partially nonconforming, then 
the buyer may only invoke CISG’s remedial provisions as to that portion unless that partial failure alone amounts 
to a “fundamental breach.”  
 385  CISG art. 40; BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (Petroecuador), 332 F.3d 333, 
338 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 386  CISG art. 44. Unsurprisingly, the definition of “reasonable excuse” is contested and unsettled. 
DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 370. 
 387  CISG art. 79(1); JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 423.4 (2d ed. 1991). 
 388  Bruno Zeller, The Challenge of a Uniform Application of the CISG – Common Problems and Their 
Solutions, 3 MACQUARIE J. BUS. L. 309, 313 (2006). 
 389  Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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breaching party’s inability to perform.390 In particular, attention must be paid to 
the impediment’s reasonable foreseeability, the breaching party’s control of this 
unexpected barrier, and the practices of international trade.391 Complicating any 
such analysis is the absence of any definition for the word “impediment” and the 
phrase “due to” in article 79.392 Still, that performance has become 
unforeseeably more difficult or unprofitable will not suffice to establish an 
impediment.393 Article 85 obliges the seller to “take such steps as are reasonable 
in the circumstances to preserve” goods if “the seller is either in possession of 
the goods or otherwise able to control their disposition” and the buyer has 
delayed in paying the price or taking delivery.394 Its counterpart, article 86 reads: 
“If the buyer has received the goods and intends to exercise any right under the 
contract or this Convention to reject them, he must take such steps to preserve 
them as are reasonable in the circumstances.”395 Any unreasonable delay in 
completing performance or as to goods subject to rapid deterioration or 
unreasonably expensive to store automatically allows a party to sell the relevant 
goods, provided notice of this intention has been given to the breaching party.396 
Under CISG, a breach may be either fundamental or non-fundamental. The 
latter engenders no more than a right to damages as measured by several CISG 
articles;397 the former entitles the non-breaching party not only to damages but 
also to the remedy of avoidance.398 As defined in CISG’s article 25, “[a] breach 
of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him [or her] of what he 
[or she] is entitled to expect under the contract.”399 Divided into its two clear 
elements, a “fundamental” breach is uniquely material, substantially depriving 
a party of the bargain’s benefits, and results in a deprivation that was reasonably 
 
 390  Mazzotta, supra note 217, at 108. 
 391  Todd Weitzmann, Comment, Validity and Excuse in the U.N. Sales Convention, 16 J.L. & COM. 265, 
286 (1997). 
 392  Id. at 282. 
 393  DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 425. 
 394  CISG art. 85; see Jianming Shen, The Remedy of Requiring Performance under the CISG and the 
Relevance of Domestic Rules, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 253, 276 (1996) (“Articles 85 through 88 impose 
upon the parties general duties of preservation and disposal of the goods.”). 
 395  CISG art. 86(1); Charles Sukurs, Note, Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the 
United States, Canada, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 34 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1481, 1508 n.190 (2001). 
 396  CISG art. 88(1)–(2). 
 397  See infra Part V.C.1. 
 398  Schwenzer, supra note 295, at 799. 
 399  CISG art. 25; Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, No. 01-5254 (DRD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16620, at *24 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2006); Hilaturas Miel, S.L., 573 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (defining “fundamental breach” 
under CISG). 
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foreseeable at the time of the contract’s formation.400 Though the term is 
inescapably vague,401 based on this two-part delineation, at least seven actions 
have been regarded as “fundamental breaches” by a multitude of courts, 
including: (1) non-delivery or refusal to deliver goods, though not a failure to 
fulfill a minor condition; (2) late delivery if time of performance is of the 
essence, a seller knows of the buyer’s urgent need, the prices of the goods 
purchased are subject to extreme fluctuations, or the buyer has already fixed an 
additional period for delivery after the seller’s initial failure to timely deliver; 
the seller infringes (3) a resale restriction, (4) a valid exclusive sales agreement, 
or (5) a re-import restriction;402 (6) “non-payment of the purchase price,” 
characterized by one court as “the most significant form of a fundamental breach 
by a buyer”;403 or (7) the non-conformity of the delivered goods.  
Interestingly, nonperformance will not alone constitute a fundamental 
breach as long as “prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that 
one of the parties will commit a fundamental breach of contract” and “the party 
intending to declare the contract avoided . . . give[s] reasonable notice to the 
other party in order to permit him [or her] to provide adequate assurance of his 
[or her] performance.”404 This latter provision as to notice does not apply “if the 
other party has [already] declared that he [or she] will not perform his 
obligations.”405 Any such breach as to one delivery of an installment contract 
does not entitle the non-breaching party to assert a fundamental breach of the 
entire contract.406 The latter is only justified if this discrete failure “gives the 
other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will 
occur with respect to future instalments” as well.407 When viewed overall, then, 
 
 400  CISG art. 25; Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72898, at 
*27–28 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013); see also, e.g., Harry M. Flechtner, Remedies under the New International 
Sales Convention: The Perspective from Article 2 of the U.C.C., 8 J. L. & COM. 53, 57, 75 (1988); DiMatteo et 
al., supra note 201, at 414. 
 401  Clemens Pauly, The Concept of Fundamental Breach as an International Principle to Create 
Uniformity of Commercial Law, 19 J. L. & COM. 221, 229 (2000). 
 402  Ulrich Magnus, The Remedy of Avoidance of Contract under CISG – General Remarks and Special 
Cases, 25 J. L. & COM. 423, 432–35 (2005-06) (finding (1) through (5) from a series of international cases); 
Shuttle Packaging Sys. L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *27–28 (W.D. 
Mich. Dec. 17, 2001) (positing (6)).  
 403  Shuttle Packaging Sys. L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV-691, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21630, at *27–
28 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001). 
 404  CISG art. 72(1)–(2); Magellan Int’l Corp. v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925 (N.D. 
Ill. 1999). 
 405  CISG art. 72(3); Magellan Int’l Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 925.  
 406  CISG art. 73(1); Blair, supra note 175, at 313 n.197. 
 407  CISG art. 73(2); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1108 n.2 
(8th Cir. 2011).  
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CISG strives to preserve the contract short of the most dramatic of violations of 
a bargain provably struck. 
2. Code Application of CISG’s Oddities 
Now moving decisively beyond the UCC’s terrain, the foregoing articles 
create a novel set of duties and concept of breach. Whether a breach has occurred 
sufficient to trigger liability and, with it, a Code claim, these interlocking tenets 
must be applied. Whether the debtor is a seller or buyer, a failure to comply with 
these requirements may leave a debtor subject to a cause of action under 
§ 523(a)(2). These consequences arise from this subsection’s common 
construal: an omission of a material fact and a failure to make an effort to 
perform, both misdeeds actionable under § 523(a)(2)(A), and actions 
inconsistent with those of a reasonable person, such substandard conduct 
triggering liability under § 523(A)(2)(B), must be measured by the debtor’s 
duties, as imposed by the pertinent contract and these sundry CISG articles. If 
the debtor fulfilled its CISG-imposed duties, no contractual breach could have 
taken place, but if it ignored them, it has not only birthed a claim but also 
violated § 523(a)(2). Lastly, CISG alone will determine how the breach—and 
liability for a debt—must be classified, whether branded as “fundamental” or 
something else entirely.  
C. Measuring Damages  
1. Summary of Relevant Articles 
Articles 45 and 61 establish the cumulative remedies available to a non-
breaching buyer and seller, respectively.408 In accordance with article 61(1), an 
aggrieved seller may require the buyer’s performance as defined in article 62, 
fix an additional time for compliance as permitted by article 63, avoid or cancel 
the contract under article 64, or have the goods identified under the contract per 
article 65.409 In addition to one of these remedies, the seller may seek damages 
as measured under article 74.410 Under article 45(1), an aggrieved buyer may 
require performance or substitute performance under article 46(2), demand 
repair of defective goods under article 46(3), fix an additional time for 
 
 408  CISG arts. 45, 61; Harry M. Flechtner, Buyers’ Remedies in General and Buyers’ Performance-
Oriented Remedies, 25 J.L. & COM. 339, 341 (2005–06). 
 409  CISG art. 61(1)(a); Fabio Bortolotti, Remedies Available to the Seller and Seller’s Right to Require 
Specific Performance (Articles 61, 62, and 28), 25 J.L. & COM. 335, 335 (2005–06). 
 410  CISG art. 61(1)(b), (2); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Group L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 
1108 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing to article 61(1)).  
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performance under article 47, accept a seller’s cured performance under articles 
37 and 48, avoid or cancel the contract under article 49, or unilaterally reduce 
the sales price pursuant to article 50.411 In addition to one of these nonmonetary 
remedies, the buyer may ask for any and all damages authorized by article 74.412  
Intended to provide the injured party with the bargain’s benefit,413 article 74 
sets the general rule for damages: “Damages for breach of contract by one party 
consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other 
party as a consequence of the breach.”414 As widely construed, this article does 
not require that damages be proven with “reasonable certainty.”415  
Regardless of the breach’s nature; however, CISG expressly limits the size 
of any award under article 74 by means of two provisions. Article 74’s second 
sentence specifically subjects any damages determination to a foreseeability 
principle; thus, damages may not exceed “the loss which the party in breach 
foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, 
in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have 
known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.”416 The second 
restriction is the mitigation principle provided for in article 77, which directs the 
non-breaching party “[to] take such measures as are reasonable in the 
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the 
breach.”417 Failure to do so entitles the breaching party “[to] claim a reduction 
in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated.”418 
Once damages under article 74 have been tabulated, article 78 allows for interest 
“without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable” under the latter 
article.419 The expenses for preserving goods received or to be delivered, set 
 
 411  CISG art. 45(1)(a); Flechtner, supra note 408, at 340. 
 412  CISG art. 45(1)(b), (2); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ. 5189 (RCC), 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006). 
 413  Eric C. Schneider, Measuring Damages under the CISG – Article 74 of the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 9 PACE INT’L L. REV. 223, 228 (1997). 
 414  CISG art. 74; Zapata Hermanos Sucesores v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d 385, 388 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 415  Schneider, supra note 413, at 229. 
 416  CISG art. 74; Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 417  CISG art. 77; Schneider, supra note 413, at 236–37. 
 418  CISG art. 77; 2P Commercial Agency S.R.O. v. SRT USA, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-652-FtM-29SPC, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112706, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2012). 
 419  CISG art. 78. Because CISG “provides no guidance for calculating such interest and gives no indication 
of the circumstances under which pre-judgment interest should be awarded,” Schneider, supra note 413, at 230–
31, domestic and foreign courts almost uniformly regard the matter as a procedural issue outside of CISG’s 
scope, Djakhongir Saidov, Damages: The Need for Uniformity, 25 J.L. & COM. 393, 399 (2005–06). 
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forth in articles 85 and 86, are equally recoverable from the breaching party or 
deductible from the sales proceeds.420 
Of the aforementioned nonfinancial remedies, that of avoidance, available 
to buyers under article 49 and sellers under article 64, “releases both parties from 
their obligations under it, subject to any damages which may be due.”421 A 
cabined remedy, CISG’s avoidance provisions can only be invoked either when 
a breach is fundamental or when the other party does not fulfill any of his, her, 
or its obligations within the additional time,422 if any, granted by the non-
breaching party.423 Further subject to the constraints in article 49(2) whenever 
delivery has been made, or article 64(2) when the price has been paid,424 
avoidance further requires that notice both be given and be properly 
communicated,425 though notice may be in writing or orally, CISG itself 
requiring no specific form.426 If a contract is avoided and either the buyer has 
entered into a substitute transaction or the seller has resold the goods, the 
damages must equal “the difference between the contract price and the price in 
the substitute transaction.”427 If the contract is avoided but neither a substitute 
transaction or a resale has transpired, the aggrieved party may instead “recover 
the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the 
time of avoidance.”428 “Current price” is defined in article 76(2) as “the price 
prevailing at the place where delivery of the goods should have been made or, if 
there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves as a 
reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of 
transporting the goods.”429  
On the other hand, if a party operating under article 76 has taken over the 
goods prior to the contract’s proper avoidance, “the current price at the time of 
such taking over shall be applied instead of the current price at the time of 
 
 420  CISG arts. 85, 86(1), 88(3). 
 421  CISG art. 81(1); Topp Paper Co., LLC v. ETI Converting Equip., No. 12-21014-CIV-
Rosenbaum/Seltzer, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141193, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2013). 
 422  The procedure to be followed in such cases is known as the “Nachfirst procedure” and is detailed in 
articles 47 and 63. 
 423  CISG arts. 49(1), 64(1); Flechtner, supra note 400, at 70. 
 424  CISG arts. 49(2), 64(2). 
 425  CISG arts. 26–27. 
 426  Magnus, supra note 402, at 426. 
 427  CISG art. 75; Semi-Materials Co. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1791, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011). 
 428  CISG art. 76(1); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1108 n.2 
(8th Cir. 2011). 
 429  CISG art. 76(2); Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., No. No. 08-
762(DSD/SRN), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51066, at *5 (D. Minn. July 1, 2008), rev’d, 635 F.3d 1106. 
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avoidance.”430 Under articles 75 and 76, the aggrieved party may claim any and 
all “further damages recoverable under article 74.”431 Avoidance concurrently 
allows both the breaching and no-breaching party to “claim restitution from the 
other party of whatever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract.”432 
2. Code Application of CISG’s Oddities 
Generally, perhaps as a consequence of their pro-buyer proclivities, CISG 
and the UCC catalogue the same remedies, as aggrieved party can cancel a 
contract, sue for performance, or collect damages, including consequential 
damages,433 and set a similar upper limit as to damages.434 Yet, as perusal 
reveals, several pivotal differences as to these remedies’ extent and exercise can 
be pinpointed. Touching upon how a breach is to be monetized and unrealized 
bargains are to be quantified, these distinctions can produce vastly different 
valuations of the same contractual violation and thus any potential creditor’s 
bankruptcy claim.  
In certain ways, CISG’s application will yield a claim larger than the UCC 
countenances. First, because CISG elects for no precise or certain statute of 
limitations,435 no time’s passing will necessarily extinguish a valid action for 
breach of contract. Conversely, the UCC both specifies that “a cause of action 
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of 
knowledge of the breach”436 and implements a four-year maximum.437 Second, 
while CISG and the UCC provide that warranties exist only as provided for in 
the parties’ agreement,438 the former’s article 35 can be properly read to suggest 
 
 430  CISG art. 76(1); Saidov, supra note 369, at 321 n.71; Jeffrey S. Sutton, Comment, Measuring Damages 
under the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 737, 746 (1989). 
 431  CISG arts. 75, 76(1); DiMatteo et al., supra note 201, at 419. 
 432  CISG art. 81(2); Frisch, supra note 177, at 552 & n.287. 
 433  CISG arts. 45–52, 61–65, 74–77; U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711. This congruence may be partly due to the 
federal courts’ use of the UCC to construe CISG’s central damages provision, article 74. See Delchi Carrier Spa 
v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1030 n.2 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting article 74 by looking to the U.C.C. and 
case law defining “incidental damages”).  
 434  Compare CISG art. 74, with General Star Indem. Co. v. Bankr. Estate of Lake Geneva Sugar Shack, 
Inc., 572 N.W.2d 881, 889 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Wisconsin’s version of the U.C.C., which limits 
consequential damages to those “as are the natural and probable consequences of the breach and were within 
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made”). 
 435  See, e.g., U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868, 873 (N.Y. Gen. Term 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, this absence has often led courts to borrow the U.C.C. statute of limitations in accordance with 
article 7. See, e.g., Thyssenkrupp Metallurgical Prods. GmbH v Energy Coal, No. 653938/14, 2015 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 3741, at *11–12 (N.Y. Gen. Term Oct. 14, 2015); U.S. Nonwovens Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d at 873. 
 436  U.C.C. § 2-725(b). 
 437  Id. § 2-725(a).  
 438  Compare CISG art. 35(1), with U.C.C. § 2-313. 
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the existence of implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose and 
merchantability439—and actually eases a buyer’s burden of proving the former’s 
breach relative to the UCC.440 Third, in a likely reflection of its ambivalence 
regarding the issue of consequential damages,441 the UCC allows the buyer to 
seek consequential and incidental damages442 but bars the seller from obtaining 
anything other than incidental damages.443 CISG, however, explicitly authorizes 
any aggrieved party, whether buyer or seller, to pursue consequential and 
incidental damages,444 subject to the limitations of foreseeability and 
mitigation.445 In fact, CISG differs in two more crucial particulars from the UCC 
and its attendant case law as to this very issue: it both allows an aggrieved party 
first to declare the contract voided and then demand damages446 and does not 
require that any loss be foreseeable by both parties at the time of the contract’s 
conclusion.447 Under CISG, then, a simple claim may exceed its total value 
under the UCC.448 
In other ways, however, CISG would constrict, not augment, any contractual 
claim. Most significantly, this treaty recommends a higher bar for imposing 
liability for breach of contract. On the other hand, because the UCC recognizes 
the perfect tender rule, it empowers a buyer to reject goods that fail in any respect 
to conform to the contract even if a defect is minor and substantially the same 
goods for which the buyer has bargained have been delivered;449 a minor defect, 
then, may rightly engender the full panoply of contractual damages. In contrast, 
 
 439  See, e.g., Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120183, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); Norfolk S. Rail Ry. V. Power Source Supply, Inc., Civ. No. 
06-58 J, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56942, at *14 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008). 
 440  Compare CISG art. 35(2), with U.C.C. § 2-315. 
 441  See U.C.C. § 1-305(a). 
 442  Id. § 2-715. 
 443  Id. § 2-710. Recovery by sellers for consequential damages may be possible, however, if the “lost 
profit” language of section 2-708(2) is liberally applied. Id. § 2-708(2). Another avenue for accomplishing the 
same result would be for the seller to argue that the loss falls under the heading of incidental damages. 
 444  See CISG art. 74. Naturally enough, CISG itself complicates this analysis by defining damages as “a 
sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.” Id. 
(emphasis added). Courts and scholars nonetheless construe article 74 as authorizing recovery of all damages, 
however labeled, traceable to the breach. 
 445  See CISG arts. 74, 77.  
 446  Compare id. at art. 45(2), with U.C.C. §§ 2-711(1), 2-703. 
 447  Compare CISG art. 74, with U.C.C. §§ 2-715(2)(a). 
 448  One more difference merits mention. Famously, CISG treats specific performance as a standard 
remedy, claimable “unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement,” while 
the UCC disfavors such a tonic’s imposition, strictly specifying how and in what circumstances specific 
performance may be compelled.Logically, when specific performance is no longer a feasible, the loss of that 
possible remedy should be included in the aggrieved party’s complete tabulation of damages. Article 28, of 
course, forecloses this possibility. 
 449  U.C.C. § 2-601 
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the CISG forecloses the possibility of such an award by requiring the occurrence 
of a “fundamental breach” before a contract may be terminated in full.450 
Second, the UCC lets a buyer to collect consequential damages for “[i]njury to 
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.”451 CISG, 
however, bars any such relief.452 
CONCLUSION 
With unremitting confidence and mind-numbing repetition, CISG has been 
described as the international counterpart to the UCC’s second article.453 
Admittedly, because “[m]any provisions of the UCC and the CISG are the same 
or similar,”454 “case law interpreting analogous provisions of Article 2” may 
“inform a court where the language of the relevant CISG provision tracks that 
of the UCC.”455 And, in many situations, though “[t]he common law of contracts 
evolved from the . . . [lex mercatoria], the civil law of contracts from canon 
law,” “differences in outcome under the two legal regimes are small and 
shrinking.”456 This undeniable fact, however, can obscure a crucial verity: 
because textual and interpretive divergences do persist, “UCC caselaw ‘is not 
per se applicable,’”457 and CISG sometimes dictates an outcome impossible 
under the UCC. For these reasons, “it is shortsighted and misleading to say that 
the concepts of the CISG correspond to those of the UCC and that the UCC 
lawyer can find comfort in the CISG’s similarities to the UCC.”458  
 
 450  CISG arts. 25. Notably, however, article 35 requires goods to strictly conform to the contract’s 
specifications. As a result, despite implying a stricter standard, a seller remains effectively liable under the CISG 
for “any lack of nonconformity.” Regardless, a buyer may always opt for the self-help remedy of unilateral 
proportionate purchase price reduction for the seller’s delivery of non-conforming goods.  
 451  U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b). 
 452  CISG art. 5. 
 453  Chicago Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 408 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 
Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp. L.L.C., 635 F.3d 1106, 1107 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Chicago Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898). 
 454  Chicago Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898; see also VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading 
Co., 748 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Chicago Prime Packers, Inc., 408 F.3d at 898). 
 455  Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 456  Bodum USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 635 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing to Joseph M. Perillo, 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 308 n.190 (1994)); cf. Harold J. Berman, The Law of International Commercial 
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 235, 295 (1988) (“Despite wide differences 
among national legal systems, enterprises of all countries have developed a high degree of uniformity in contract 
practices for the export and import of goods,” leading to “general similarities of contract practice and contract 
law.”).  
 457  Delchi Carrier SpA, 71 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Orbisphere Corp. v. United States, 726 F. Supp. 1344, 
1355 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1989)); see also Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1023–24. 
 458  Ferrari, supra note 197, at 1033. 
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As this Article has demonstrated, in three particular areas—contract 
formation, breach definition, and damages’ calculation—CISG, in fact, does so 
more often than not. Even as an overwhelming majority of U.S. courts have 
proved reluctant to acknowledge these dissimilarities, producing a body of 
precedent riven with methodological infirmities upon which others foolishly 
rely, this truth cannot be rightly ignored within bankruptcy’s domain. In point 
of fact, when an international contract is implicated, upon a court’s proper choice 
between CISG and the UCC may depend the security of debtor’s fresh start and 
a creditor’s return as well as the legitimacy of a liquidation or the unassailability 
of a reorganization. If the Code’s ends are to be achieved in such cases, CISG’s 
provisions, then, must be fully heeded, the map sketched throughout this piece 
intently followed. By command of Senate, President, and countless others, this 
singular law, one which rightly reigns domestically and internationally, thus 
commands so that trade may escalate and barriers may fall. Otherwise, good 
faith will wither, and ills unwanted will be unleashed, far beyond the reach of 
any single court and any single code. Via these means, commerce will, as so 
many hoped, flourish among honest merchants,459 the only class of debtors for 
which the Code reserves its succor460 and that CISG strives to serve. As history 
attests, such a world has been the goal of every mercantile corpus forged since 
the first country fair was held,461 the ends deemed just by “the prosaic agencies 
of th[is most] commercial world”462 within and beyond the mutable bounds of 
modern bankruptcy law.  
 
 
 459  Baird, supra note 26, at 1292 (“Llewellyn’s commercial law . . . sought to work within an existing 
landscape,” with the goal of “ensuring that commerce flourishes among honest merchants.”). 
 460  Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 374 (2007) (observing that the bankruptcy laws were enacted 
to protect honest but unfortunate debtors).  
 461  See Baird, supra note 26, at 1290. 
 462  JOSEPH CONRAD, THE SHADOW-LINE, A CONFESSION 35 (Penguin Books 2007) (1917). 
